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Japan accounts  for  about 20 percent of foreign aid to developing countries and for  10
percent of  their exports, and its  economic health is  therefore important to  developing
regions. 7he decline in asset prices in Japan since 1991 has contributed  to an increase in
bad debts of the country's  financial institutions, has slowed credit extension through the
erosion of their capital base, and has been an important factor  in the long  recession.
Although the possibility of  a  systemic financial sector crisis that will shake up  world
financial market - the so-called 'Japan Problem' - is unlikely, the authorities may have to
restructure  severely affected institutions, which could result in higher fiscal expenditures  or
debt stock, a less favorable starting point from which to confront the problems associated
with  population aging. The  impacts of such a restructuring  on developing  countries  are likely
to be most serious  for  indebted primary commodity exporters. Low-income countries are
likely to be affected by fiscal pressures on Japanese  foreign aid. On the other hand, many
Asian exporters  of low-cost  manufactures  to Japan may be relatively  unaffected.
l.  Introduction  - Background  and Issues
Japan's business  cycle downtum, which started in 1991 with a burst in the asset price
bubble, produced  one of the longest  recessions in its post-war history before it showed  signs of
recovery  toward the end  of 1993  (see Figure 1).' The recovery,  although  weak, lasted  for more  than a
year before coming  to a virtual standstill  toward the end of the second  quarter of 1995,  when there
were signs of renewed  recession  with mounting  risks of deflationary  process (see Figure 2). The
deepening  problems  within  Japan's financial  sector  and the strengthening  of the yen in the first half of
1995 were the main factors that diminished  hopes for recovery. Most alarming  is the fact that a
recovery  in the employment  situation  has never  been  observed;  in fact, as Japan's Economic  Planning
Agency  (EPA) has stated, it remained  severe  and continued  to deteriorate  during the recent gradual
recovery  (see Figure  2).
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'  According  to the Economic  Planning  Agency's  reference  dates  of business  cycles,  the bubble  cycle  had a
53-month  expansion  phase  (from  November  1986  to April 1991),  followed  by a contraction  phase  spanning
30 months  (from  April 1991  to October  1993). The average  duration  of Japan's post-war  business  cycle
expansion  has  been  33.5  months,  while  contractions  have  averaged  16.9  months.
1The build-up  of deflationary  pressures  in Japan has also been aggravated  by continued
declines  in asset prices and deterioration  in personal,  corporate,  and financial  sector  balance sheets.
From their peaks in 1991, the price of commercial  land has fallen by 85 percent and the price of
urban residential  land has fallen by a third, gathering downward  momentum. The aggregate  net
worth of all households  has shrunk  by a third since 1991,  dampening  consumer  spending. By mid
1995,  accumulated  bad debts  on bank balance  sheets  were an estimated  42 trillion  yen ($420  billion),
roughly  equal  to 9 percent of Japan's GDP. Partly  as a result of the banking  sector's deteriorating
capital base, domestic  credit extended  by banks has been stagnant for more than two years, and
consumer  and business  confidence  has fallen due to the record 3 percent unemployment  and weak
wage  growth.  The relative  concentration  of bad debts in smaller  financial  institutions  such  as regional
banks, credit unions,  and mortgage  institutions  has increased  their exposure to bank runs, such as
those  that occurred  in several  institutions  in the  Tokyo-Kansai  area in the second  half of 1995. These
runs raised the specter of a systemic  financial sector crisis that could shake up world financial
markets  - the so-called  "Japan Problem."
Given these rather new phenomena  in Japan's post-war economic  history, analyses are
needed  to identify  the sources  and effects  of this prolonged  recession.  Problems  in the financial  sector
that have  been  a drag on the Japanese  economy  need  to be closely  studied. Negative  spillover  effects
are matters of great concern  in the world economy,  and particularly  in developing  regions.  Since
Japan accounts  for about  20 percent  of foreign  aid to developing  countries  and for 10 percent  of their
exports, its economic  health is important for the developing  world.  This paper analyzes the
continuing  impacts  of these  issues  on developing  countries.
In the next section,  the paper illustrates  the mechanics  behind  the creation  and bursting of
the financial  bubble.  It then discusses  the multiple  causes of the subsequent  prolonged  recession.  In
Section  III, the paper analyses  the problems  in Japan's financial  sector  and their negative  impacts  on
its economy. It also discusses  the risks of the financial institutions  failing to meet BIS capital
adequacy  ratios,  and briefly  describes  the policy  measures  taken  up to the latter  half of 1995.  Section
W discusses  the plausibility  of the "Japan Problem."  Section  V speculates  on what form a public
bailout would  be likely  to take in Japan in the event  of a financial  sector  crisis, in comparison  to the
recent  financial  sector  crises  in the U.S. and Europe.  Section  VI presents  some  indicative  results from
model-based  simulations  to investigate  the possible  ripple  effects  on the rest of the world economy  in
the wake of a financial  crisis.  The final section summarizes  the findings and implications  of the
paper.
II.  Bubble Burst and Compound Recession
A.  Creation of the Bubble
As Japan recovered  from the short "yen-daka"  (yen's appreciation)  recession  of 1985-86,
which  was triggered  by the Plaza Accord,  asset prices  had an explosive  increase  (see Figures 3 and
4). The recovery  and subsequent  expansion  from 1986  to 1991  was characterized  by several factors
that were conducive  to the creation of a bubble: (i) fiscal stimuli mobilized  in order to expand
domestic  absorption;  (ii) a policy of low interest rates to stimulate  private investment;  (iii) windfall
2profits due to lower import  costs that, in turn, were caused  by a rapid appreciation  of yen after the
Plaza Accord;  and (iv) lower oil prices in the international  markets. 2 With these four supportive
elements,  the Japanese  economy  expanded  during  this period  at an average rate of 5 percent a year.
This period  was also characterized  by a strong  growth  in plant and equipment  investment.  With the
fear  of a rapidly  shrinking  pool of domestic  labor  due to the much-publicized  aging  of the population,
the expansion  soon hit a resource  shortage,  manifested  in low unemployment  and an extraordinarily
active recruitrnent  of new college  graduates.  However,  the economic  overheating,  which normally
results in visible wage increases  and inflation  in goods and service prices, instead produced an
explosive  increase  in the  prices  of stock  assets.
An economic  theory  that prescribes  the normal  relationship  between  investments  and asset
prices (equity  prices)  gives us a useful guide for viewing  asset prices as business  cycle indicators.
That is, if a market is efficient,  the equity price should precisely  reflect future earnings  created  by
corporate investments. A deviation  in asset price from an investment  earning ratio - Tobin's q
(average  q) - is considered  a noise  that, in turn, results from market inefficiency  and/or  expectation
(bubble)  elements. Ogawa (1994a), after analyzing  this relationship  by measuring  movements  in
average  q and marginal  q during  this bubble  period,  found  that there was significant  noise  during  the
period  and that it was related  to the values  of land  assets  owned  by corporate  sectors.
The movements  in asset prices during this period had two components:  one reflected  an
improvement in  economic fundamentals, and  the  other  represented the  bubble  elements.
Improvements  in economic  fundamentals  were particularly  visible in a rapid expansion  in corporate
profits (fundamental  to equity prices) and in demand  for office space in major cities -Tokyo, in
particular (fundamental  to land prices).  These key improvements  in fundamentals  were, in turn,
supported by low interest rates and strong growth in money stock (see Figures 5 and 6).  The
discount  rate was lowered  from 5 percent  in January 1986  to 2.5 percent  in February 1987,  and was
kept  at this low  level  until  May 1989.  The  bubble  elements  were  formed  by rising  asset prices, which,
in turn, drew speculative  investments  in equities and land purchases in search of capital gains.
Capital  gains on equity/land  reached  about 490 trillion  yen, worth over 140 percent  of GNP in 1987
(see Table 1). During the four years from 1986 to  1989, capital gains on land and stock assets
surpassed  gross domestic  output produced  during the same period by more than 17 percent! Low
interest  rates and abundant  liquidity  worked  as leverage  to expand  speculative  investments  in stock
assets. This speculative money game permeated all private economic  agents in  the financial,
nonfinancial corporate, and  household sectors. Throughout this  period, financial institutions
increased  their asset holdings  in equities  and land  through  direct investments  and loans to real estate
developers. In 1987,  the growth  of loans to real estate developers  was twice as high as that of total
loans. 3 Since Japan's financial  institutions  use land as collateral  for their loans, the rising land
values provided a  push to  create credit through both demand and supply-side factors.  BIS
regulations,  by allowing  financial  institutions  to count 45 percent  of their unrealized  gains as capital
base, relieved  ceilings  for loan creation. As a result, bank loans continued  to grow at around 12
2  During  1985,  the  ratio  of the  value  of fuel  imports  to nominal  GNP  fell  by  about  3 percentage  points.
3  For  a more  detailed  account  of this  issue,  see  Research  Bureau,  Economic  Planning  Agency,  State of the
Japanese  Economy-Review  and  Issues of the Japanese  Economy  in 1995, December  1995.
3percent year during  this period  (see  Figure 6), twice  as fast as the growth  in nominal  GDP (6 percent
a year)  during  the same  period.
B.  Bursting of the Bubble
The end of the bubble  was triggered  by changes  in interest rates and subsequent  liquidity
control  (see Figures  5 and 6). The discount  rate was raised  in May 1989  - the first time in 9 years -
to 3.25 percent in an effort to stem inflationary  pressures caused by the overheating  of economic
activities. In March 1990  it was raised  again,  to 5.25 percent  - the level prevailing  before  the Plaza
accord.  This high rate was effective  in slowing  down  both real investment  and investment  in stock
assets.
With the introduction  of quantity restrictions  on bank lending  to the real estate sector in
1990,  the market  was convinced  that the liquidity  squeeze  had been devised  not merely  as a counter-
cyclical  measure  but also as a counter-bubble  measure.  This, in turn, led  to a reversal  in expectations
for asset price movements.  The BIS regulation  on owned  capital also worked  negatively  in this phase
by restricting  bank lending.  During  the expansion  phase, the part of the BIS regulation  that governs
Tier 2 of own  funds helped  accelerate  bank lending  through a revaluation  of supplementary  capital
due to increasing  latent  gains of listed securities.  In a symmetrical  manner,  the regulation  worked  to
discourage  bank lending  during  the collapse  in equity  prices.  The corporate  sector,  which largely  lost
direct financing  from the capital  market,  was also deprived  of indirect  financing  through  the banking
sector  due to the credit  crunch  aggravated  by this BIS regulation. 4
A rapid reduction  in speculative  investments  softened  both demand  and asset prices, thus
creating  a downward  spiral. Capital  loss amounted  to about  200 trillion  yen (42 percent of GDP) in
1991,  and more  than 400 trillion  yen (87 percent  of GDP) in 1992 (see Table 1 and Figure 7) After
the bubble  burst, the rate of decline  in asset prices  from April 1991  to October  1993  was much  larger
(a decline  of 53.6 percent  in stock prices,  27.5 percent  in land  prices)  than the decline  had been  from
November  1973  to March 1975  (a decline  of 30.9 percent in stock  prices, 6.8 percent  in land prices),
during  the severe  stagnation  after the first oil crisis (see Table 2). That is, the self-inflicted  bubble
burst in the early 1990s  created  a larger collapse  in the domestic  asset markets  than had been  caused
by a major external aggregate  supply shock almost  two decades  earlier. Such capital losses in the
1990s negatively affected output growth by  dampening business investments and  consumer
spending.'
4  Sawabe  (1994)  noted  the  destabilizing  aspects  of this  BIS  regulation.
5  Model-based  simulations  presented  in Section  VI show  that, other  things  being  equal,  a 25 percent
decline  in stock  price  will  reduce  Japan's  GDP  by  0.05  prcent  in the first  year  in real  terms  and 0.16  percent
by  the third  year  (in levels).  A 25 percent  decline  in land  prices  is estimated  to reduce  Japan's  real  GDP  by
0.4  percent  in the  first  year,  and 1.4  percent  by the  third  year.
4C.  Compound  andProlongedRecession
The seemingly  normal  business  cycle  recession  that began in April 1991 was deepened  and
lengthened  by compounding  structural and external  factors. Monetary  and fiscal tightening  in 1989
initially  led to a normal slowdown  in credit creation  and business  investment  (see Figures 6 and 8).
However,  equity  prices started to drop drastically  in 1990 and land prices started  to drop in 1991,
following  the introduction  of quantity  restrictions  on bank loans to the real estate sector in 1990  (see
Figures 3 and 4).  This bubble  burst aggravated  the cycle downturn.  As capital loss permeated  all
private  sectors,  consumer  confidence  and spending,  business  confidence  and new investments,  and the
financial  sector's lending  activities  slowed  rapidly.
The rapid appreciation  of the yen during  the first 8 months  of 1993  lengthened  the business
cycle downturn  (see Figure 9).  During this period, the yen appreciated  by more than 20 percent
against  the dollar  (125.1  to 103.7  yen/$),  or by about  25 percent  in real effective  terms. Thus, there
was no opportunity  for the "export drive" to which Japan has traditionally  resorted in times of
recession.  Rather, with a rise in consumer  awareness  in response  to less expensive  imported  goods,
import  penetration  has continued  to rise, nearing  a historically  high level  of 12 percent  (in relation  to
GDP in real terms)  at the end of 1995,  and thus creating  a continuous  leak of recovery  to the rest of
the world  (see Figure 10).7 Unlike  the yen's appreciation  after the Plaza Accord,  which  triggered  a
recession  - the yen had appreciated  by 35 percent against  the dollar and by 23 percent in effective
terms during the 8-month  period  September  1985  to April 1986 - this round of appreciation  came
after two years of recessionary  process,  when sales and corporate  profits fell substantially. Thus
there  were significant  negative  effects  on the confidence  of the corporate  sector.
The  burst in asset prices,  strengthening  yen, and higher  penetration  of imported  goods  gave
rise to the process  of disinflation  (see Figure  2). This tumed  out to be another  factor in the prolonged
recession through a  visible squeeze in  corporate profits.  A collapse in  asset prices and the
subsequent  recession  had widened  the output  gap by dampening  domestic  demand  (a downward  shift
of the aggregate  demand  curve),  thus exerting  deflationary  pressure. However,  more  importantly,  the
current  disinflation  has also been  caused  by supply  factors  (a downward  shift of the aggregate  supply
curve). Those  factors  include  advances  in deregulation,  particularly  in the distribution  sector;  a rapid
rise in import  penetration  that has paralleled  the rise observed  in the United  States  in the 1980s;  and a
rise in consumers'  price awareness,  which  has increased  the price elasticity  of their demand  for both
domestically  produced  goods and imports. Although  the supply-side  factors for disinflation  should
benefit  the economy  in the long run, it has lengthened  the recession  by reducing  corporate  profits and
6  The  U.S.  Federal  Reserve  Board  guided  interest  rates  lower  during  this period  and produced  economic
expansion  driven mainly  by private investment. The growth  driven  by investment  was conducive  to
productivity  growth,  which,  coupled  with  gradual  depreciation  in its effective  exchange  rate,  expanded  U.S.
exports.  Thanks  to the depreciation  of  their  currency  in relation  to Japanese  yen, East  Asian  manufacturing
exporters  gained  more  than 2 percentage  points  in their market  share  in the  U.S. import  market,  displacing
Japanese  exports.
'  For  a more  detailed  account  of this issue  of market  opening,  see Shigeru  Otsubo,  "Prospects  for Japan's
Trade  - Market  Opening?"  Appendix  B in "Globalization:  A New  Role  for Developing  Countries  in an
Integrating  World,"  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  No.  1628, World  Bank  (July  1996).
5employment activities. The current business cycle pattern  is forcing structural  adjustments in the
corporate sector during the prolonged cycle downturn.  In the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, the
downturn lasted for only 16-17 months (16 months after the first oil crisis, 17 months after the Plaza
Accord),  and  the  structural  adjustments  could be made  against  the  backbone  of  an  expanding
economy. This time, however, the larger-scale corporate restructuring necessitated by the recession
has resulted in explicit unpaid  unemployment (see Figure  2), and thus has  undermined consumer
confidence.
The combination of these structural factors  has  produced a  pattern  of stagnant  income
generation in the midst of a recovery in industrial production, thus  making the current round of
recovery, which started in late  1993, very fragile (see Figure  1).  Another occurrence in the yen's
rapid appreciation was observed during the first 6 months of 1995, hindering the continuation of the
fragile recovery (see Figure 9). Between December 1994 and June 1995, the yen had appreciated by
24 percent against the U.S. dollar.  With the emergence of financial sector problems in 1995, the
Japanese economy headed towards the second dip.
III.  Financial Sector Problems and Their Negative Impacts  on the Economy
A.  The Increasing Size of Nonperforming  Loans
With the collapse in land and stock prices, Japan's deposit-taking financial institutions had
amassed bad  debts of about 40  trillion yen  ($400 billion) by  mid 1995, according to  an official
estimate.  Since the definition of bad debt varies across countries, however, the reported amount of
total nonperforming loans should be treated with caution. For exarnple, the amount of nonperforming
loans reported by the Mitsubishi Bank and the Bank of Tokyo to the U.S.  authority, based on the
U.S. standard, was about 2.5 times larger than that reported in Japan. 8 Since these two banks held a
much smaller stock of bad debts than city and regional banks, the official estimates of total bad loans
should be considered a lower bound.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize figures on bad loans held by deposit-taking financial institutions
in Japan, as reported by the Ministry of Finance. At the end of September 1995, the total amount of
all reported bad  loans was 37.39 trillion yen.9 The bad  loans were of two types: nonperforming
loans and restructured loans. The nonperforming loans, which accounted for about two thirds of total
bad debts, were loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy or loans that were past due.  Restructured
loans were those for which interest had been reduced to the level of an official discount rate. Table 5
8  In Japan, banks  include only  subsidiaries  with  more  than 50 percent stock  holding  and related  companies
with 20 to 50 percent stock holdings  in their consolidated  accounts  for disclosure  of their balance sheets.
This excludes  the coverage  of nonbank  financial  institutions  mobilized  by banks during the bubble period.
The U.S. Securities  and Exchange Commision  (UJSSEC),  on the other hand, requires coverage  for these
"other related agents" in reporting  the consolidated  settlement  of accounts. Mitsubishi  Bank and the Bank
of Tokyo  merged  in spring 1996  to form Tokyo  Mitsubishi  Bank.
9  This figure does not include  the bad debts held by financial  institutions  that had already gone bankrupt,
such as Cosmo  Credit  Union,  Hyogo  Bank, and Kizu Credit  Union.
6tabulates the amounts of restructured loans by  different groups  of financial institutions and their
ratios to total loans extended, estimated at the end of September 1995.  Among 21 major banks in
Japan, trust banks as a whole exhibited a very high restructured loans/total loans ratio of 5.7 percent,
compared to 1.8 percent among city banks and 3.4 percent among long-term credit banks.  Because
trust banks are closely associated with land developers, there is a  risk that these restructured loans
could eventually  turn into nonperforming  loans.
However, the entire stock of reported nonperforming loans will not necessarily become a
loss to financial institutions. Based on the figures shown in Table 3, some part of the bad loans have
already been covered by collateral or another institutional instrument designed to pay  off the loss.
For the stock of nonperforming loans, it is reported that  about 37 percent of the total  amount  is
covered by collateral.  Special loan-loss reserve accounts cover another 28 percent.10 As a  result,
unresolved loss is estimated at  around 8.4 trillion yen, only one third  of the 24.4 trillion  yen of
nonperforming loans reported by deposit-taking financial institutions. As to the stock of restructured
loans, except for those made to "Ju-Sens" (housing loan companies), half the amount (3.4 trillion
yen) is expected to be normalized, and 37 percent has been covered by collateral. The potential loss is
therefore projected at around 2.1 trillion yen.  Estimating the potential loss in loans made to Ju-Sens
is not straightforward. However, in the event that all the bad loans made by Ju-Sens are attributed
directly to parent banks as loan losses, they would amount to about 7.7 trillion yen. The total amount
of noncovered bad  loans that have to be dealt with by  deposit-taking financial institutions can be
estimated  at  18.3 trillion yen (US $183 billion at 100 yen/$).
In Figure 11, the size of bad loans is portrayed by type of bank against its collateral, loan-
loss  reserve, and  latent  gains  of  listed  securities.  As  the  figure  shows,  small  deposit-taking
institutions as a group had already faced the risk of capital inadequacy at the end of September 1995,
with about  1.58 trillion yen worth of their bad debts not covered by  collateral, reserves, or latent
gains of their security holdings.  The situation among smaller financial institutions is therefore much
worse than that of larger banks, and it will likely take them much longer to restore their financial
stability, if it can be done at all without a crisis.  Even the major 21 banks are on shaky ground, since
their latent gains of listed securities are subject to wide variations depending on the performance of
the stock market.  In addition, land - most of which is still falling in value - is a predominant
component  of the collateral for these bank loans.
Many private researchers regard the official estimates of bad loans as extremely low, since
they believe that these debts have been largely underreported. Private estimates of bad  debts range
from 50 trillion yen ($500 billion) to 100 trillion yen ($1 trillion).
Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to say that 30  to 40 percent of total bad loans had
already been covered by mid 1995 with accelerated transfers to loan-loss reserves and by liquidation
through the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Corporation Ltd (CCPC).  And banks'  operating profits
10  Coverage  rates of bad loans are estimated  by a Ministry  of Finance survey of all banks in Japan
and by the price of the credits purchased  by Cooperative  Credit  Purchasing  Corporation  Ltd. (Saiken Kaitori
Kiko).  At the end of March 1995,  the average ratio of covered  bad loans to total bad debts was about 40
percent in both estimates. In September,  the coverage  rate estimated  by the same methods declined to 37
percent, due mainly  to a decline  in land prices in city areas.
7have  begun to improve  due to the widening  interest  spread created  by a series of cuts in policy rates
(see Figure 12, Table 6, and the first row in Table 7).  The stock market has also largely recovered
from the depressed  level at the end of March 1995, adding  to a recovery  in latent gains of listed
securities. However,  it is still too early at this point  to judge whether  or not the stock of bad debt is
going to be paid off smoothly.  As Table 7 shows, even  if the arguments  are confined  to the better-
positioned  21 major banks, the ratios of nonperfomrning  loans and of unresolved  amounts  to total
assets have  not yet declined  sufficiently,  although  the banks  have been  actively  writing  off bad loans
using  loan-loss  reserves  and CCPC.  These  21 major  banks also hold a sizable  amount  of restructured
loans, as shown  in Tables 3 and 4, which could  turn into nonperforming  loans at any moment. The
aggregate  ratio of restructured loans to total assets was estimated  at 2.66 percent at the end of
September  1995. Among  the group of trust banks, the ratio of restructured  loans to total assets was
estirnated  at over 5 percent.
B.  Risks  of Failing BIS  CapitalAdequacy  Criteria
It is imperative  for banks to clear the BIS risk-asset  ratio (8 percent)  to remain  operative  in
financial  markets. As Table 8 shows,  all but one of 88 Japan's deposit-taking  financial  institutions
reportedly met this BIS regulation  in March 1995. However,  shrinking latent gains reduced the
computed  owned  capital base, and thus reduced  the group's risk assets/owned  capital ratio by 0.68
percentage  points,  down  to 9.03 percent  from 9.71 percent  at the end of fiscal  year 1993. During  the
same  period,  long-term  and regional  banks, as groups,  have  observed  declines  in their risklasset  ratios
of 0.3 to 0.5 percentage  points. City and trust banks, as groups, saw declines  of 0.81 and 1.09
percentage  points,  respectively.
Murashima  (1995)  has estimated  capital  adequacy  for the major  21 Japanese  banks. Table
9 reproduces  his estimation  of capital  adequacy  for long-termn,  city, and trust banks. Estimation  of
capital  adequacy  was made  by the following  procedures:
1)  Add  up the total amount  of nonperforming  loans made  by the 21 major banks, as reported  by the
Ministry of Finance:  the nonperforming  loans made to Ju-Sen, to nonbanks related  to Hyogo
bank,  to Nichiboushin  bank, and to nonbanks  related  to three Kansai-area  regional  banks (Fuku-
toku, Han-wa,  Osaka).
2)  Calculate  losses  from loans made  to various  institutions  by applying  the following  arbitrary loan-
loss ratios  to the stock  of nonperforming  loans and utilizing  other  adjustrnent  methods:  80 percent
for reported  debt (80 percent  of reported  nonperforming  loan is computed  as a loss); 80 percent
for nonperforming  loans made to Hyogo  bank using lenders' responsibility  method;  54 percent
for nonperforming  loans made to Nichiboushin  using lenders' responsibility  method; and 60
percent  of nonperforming  loans to Kan-sai regional  banks  using adjusted  founders' responsibility
method. For loans made to Ju-Sens, the semi-complete  founders' responsibility  method is
utilized,  based  on Ministry  of Finance  research. 1'
"  In the founders'  responsibility  method:  initial  founding  investors  of the mortgage  company  are held
accountable  for debts  at insolvency.  In the  adjusted  founders'  method:  initial  investors  grant  all the  loans  to
the mortgage  company  and other  lenders  are held  responsible  for losses,  depending  on the amount  of loans.
83)  Latent  gains of listed  securities  are assumed  to be used initially  to deal with noncovered  losses.
4)  The rest of the uncovered  loss  is assumed  to be paid off by the capital  account.
5)  The owned capital ratio  is  computed with adjusted Tier  I  (core) capital and  Tier  II
(supplementary)  capital,  observing  the rule that the total amount  of Tier II capital cannot  exceed
that of Tier I capital.
6)  Stock  prices  at the end of March 1995  are used  to derive  latent  gains of listed  securities.
The projected  reductions  in capital adequacy  ratios after the banks make lump sum write-
offs of bad loans are presented  in the last two columns  in Table 9. The simulated  worsening  in risk
assets/own  capital  ratios are so substantial  under  this scenario  that none of the three types of major
bank groups  (in aggregates)  could  satisfy  the BIS capital  adequacy  criteria  after the lump  sum write-
off.  Long-term  and trust banks would also be required  to augment  their core capital (common  or
preferred  stock),  with the expected  erosion in their Tier I capital after the write-off  If they fail to
meet the BIS capital adequacy criteria, these types of Japanese banks have to  face the risk of
extinction  - stopping their worldwide  financial  business operations  - and thus are most likely to
transmit  negative  impacts  throughout  the world  financial  markets.
Murashima  (1995) also estimated  the capacity of these banks to issue preferred stock in
order to restore  capital adequacy,  assuming  that the total issue of preferred  stock is  bound by the
legal limit (one third of the total stock issue) and that the issue price is set at 80 percent of the
prevailing  price of relevant  common  stocks. 12 Table 10 reports these estimates  for three groups of
banks: long-term,  city, and trust banks.  The last column  in Table 10 shows  the amount of raised
capital under this scenario as the ratio to risk assets for each type of bank. Technically  speaking,
therefore,  it is possible  to restore capital adequacy  by issuing preferred  stock.  However,  it is not
clear whether  the capital  market  is able  to absorb such  numerous  new issues.  There also is a risk that
new issues  could further  erode  latent  gains in the existing  stocks. For public funds  to be utilized  in
purchasing  these new issues, a tough process of consensus  building  will be required. There would
also be numerous  obstacles  to be cleared,  such as registration  procedures  and imposition  of budget
restructuring  on the  part of issuing  bodies.
It is rather  ridiculous  to argue  who  shares  the loss  and in what  proportion  because  a mortgage  company  is
one of the legally  established  stock  companies  and, therefore,  it should  be owned  only  by shareholders.
Distorting  the  solution  by  means  of administrative  guidances  should  by  no means  be permitted.
12  A commercial  low  limits  the  number  of issued  preferred  stocks  to one  third  of total  stock  in circulation.
Issuance  of preferred  stock  is a strong  option  for building  core  capital,  since  it would  be difficult,  with a
deteriorating  balance  sheet,  to issue  common  stock  at  prevailing  prices.
9C.  Policy Measures  To Date and Mounting  Negative Economic  Effects  of Nonperforming
Loans
To deal with the economic stagnation and mounting financial sector problems, Japan's
authorities initially tried to stimulate the effective demand by traditional fiscal and monetary policy
measures to lighten  the burden of bad debt - a balance sheet adjustment through economic expansion.
Monetary policy initiatives to guide the interest rates lower during this period, although introduced
only after substantial delays, can be characterized by an outward shift in the credit supply curve in
the domestic credit market, as portrayed in Figure 13 by the shift in supply curve from S to S2. The
performance of Japan's  economy from 1992 to  1994, however, was so disappointing that the initial
set of policies had no visible effect on the deepening problems.  13
The authorities, then, sought to accelerate the process of financial institutions writing off
nonperforming loans by widening the interest spread - thereby creating a profit margin for lending
operations - and by assets operations by the official funds in support of equity prices.  14  A wider
spread helped the banking sector to write off bad debts out of increased operating profits.  From a
macro point of view, however, the credit crunch continued. Figure 13 describes the mechanism of the
ongoing credit crunch. The deposit interest rate, which represents the cost of funding for the banking
sector, is assumed to move in parallel with the lending rate. In a  recessionary environment with a
decline in confidence among the corporate sector, the demand for loans is weakened at  any given
interest rate, thereby causing an inward shift of the credit demand curve, such as a shift from D to
DI  Thus the equilibrium moves from point A to point B, with a lower level of credit extension and
lending rates.  In order for the financial institutions to accelerate write-offs of their nonperforning
loans in the midst of a recession, the interest spread in their lending operations can be increased.  As
a result, the supply function shifts inward from S to Si,  taking the credit market further down to a
reduced equilibrium (a move from point B to point C).  This inward shift of the credit supply curve is
a phenomenon  of a narrowly defined credit crunch.
Even if the increased spread persists and banks continue to pay off bad loans at the rate
prevailing in mid 1995, financial institutions may not be able to wipe out a majority of bad debts
before the turn  of the  century.  The recent  downgrading of Japanese  financial  institutions will
inevitably raise their funding cQsts, and thus narrow spreads.  The growth in loans and  discounts
extended by the banking sector have been stagnant throughout 1995. This translates into a year-on-
year  growth of less than  I  percent, thus dragging the  growth of money stock,  which has  been
increasing at the sluggish rate of not more than 3 percent a year (see Figure 6). Thus, the financial
sector has hardly been playing its core role of financial intermediation for credit creation in the past
couple of years.'5 This, in turn, has been hampering a  (strong) resumption of  consumption and
13  The compound  causes of the slow recovery  after the bubble burst were analyzed in the preceding
sections. For more  details,  see  Economic Survey of Japan  1995.
14  Effects  of assets  operations  by the official  funds in support  of equity  prices on the macroeconomy  will be
discussed  in Section  VI.
15  Growth  in the stock  of high-powered  money  was offset  by a decline  in the money  multiplier.
10investment  expenditures,  thus causing  a downward  kink (or shift) in the path of capital accumulation,
which  inevitably  has serious  negative  long-term  implications.  16
A set of indicative regression analyses was conducted  to investigate the extent of the
negative  effects  of the stock of nonperforming  loans on new credit  creation  by the banking  sector  - its
central  role as a financial  intermediary. The results of these analyses,  tabulated in Table 11, show
that the ratio of bad debt to total credit extended  had a negative  correlation  with the bank's lending
activities.  Judging  from the size  of the estimated  coefficients  and their statistical significance  attached
to this factor in lending  operations,  the dampening  effects of the bad debts on new lending  activities
seem  to have  been  much larger  in smaller  financial  institutions  (regional  banks) than in the 21 major
institutions  with larger net worth (city banks, long-term  credit banks, and trust banks).  Thus, the
disappointingly  low growth in banks' credit creation  and the high lending  rates seem to have their
roots in the mounting  bad loans.
An interest  rate is thought  to have  two functions  in the market economy. An interest  rate in
real  terms  directs  an inter-temporal  (vertical)  resource  allocation  - i.e., a time preference. An interest
rate in nominal  terms guides liquidity  preference,  a horizontal  resource allocation.  Although  the
Bank of Japan continued  to supply enough high-powered  money to satisfy liquidity needs in the
economy (the second function), the  real  interest rate  did  not  decline enough to  move the
capital/earning  ratio to  stimulate current investment  expenditures (the first function). A quasi-
liquidity  trap may have happened  during this period due to ongoing  stock adjustments,  delays in
interest rate cuts, and disinflationary  pressure caused  largely  by international  trade, as analyzed  in a
previous  section.
The negative effects of widened  interest spread were simulated  in an report by Japan's
Economic  Planning  Agency  (EPA).  Assuming  that a long-term  interest  rate relevant  for consumption,
housing investment,  and plant/equipment  investment  decisions rises in  line with the postulated
increase  in the banks' lending  rate, it was shown that an increase  in spread of 0.5 percentage  point
lowered  real GDP by 0.14 percent  compared  to the base case in the first year and by 0.41 percent by
the third  year. 7
16  Not  only  a credit  crunch,  but also  a distortion  in income  distribution  might  have  occurred  under such  a
situation. Assuming  that there are three agents  in the economy  - household,  financial  institutions,  and
nonfinancial  enterprises  - a decline  in the deposit  rate  means  an income  transfer  from  household  to financial
institutions  and to nonfinancial  enterprises.  Additionally,  assuming  that a loan rate does not decline  as
much  as a deposit  rate (thus  increasing  the lending  spread),  the transfer  from  households  (saving  agent)  to
nonfinancial  enterprises  (investment  agent)  will  disappear  or be significantly  reduced,  manifested  as a social
loss,  in the  process  of financial  intermediation.
17  See  Economic  Planning  Agency,  State of Japanese Economy-Review  and Issues of Japanese Economy
in 1995,  December  1995.
11IV.  Is the "Japan  Problem"  Real?  - Risk of a Systemic  Financial  Crisis
An ailing financial  sector  not only exerts  a dampening  effect  on Japan's economic  activities
through supply side of credit creation,  but also gives rise to the risk of a systemic  financial  crisis.
The relative concentration  of bad debts in smaller financial  institutions  such as credit unions and
regional  banks gives rise to a systemic  risk of bank runs. The run that occurred in July 1995 at
Cosmo Credit  Union (the largest credit union in Tokyo),  and the subsequent  failure of Kizu Credit
Union in Osaka and another failure in the Kansai area have already depleted  a meager deposit
insurance  fund (see Table 12),  with  the authorities  having  had to step in and guarantee  the deposits  of
investors  in these institutions. In addition,  many Ju-Sens are reported  to be in deep trouble given
their link  to only land  and property  assets.
The "Japan Problem,"  as defined  in the media, foresees  a systemic  financial  sector crisis
triggered  by collapse  of a number  of financial  institutions,  which  in turn will be caused  by the lack of
explicit  policies  to rescue  banks from  bad debts.  In Japan, this anticipated  crisis is expected  to deepen
and lengthen  the recession.  Stock  and property  prices  will  further  tumble  because  equities  of financial
institutions  will  be heavily  sold, and some  of these  institutions  will be forced  to liquidate  their equity
and land holdings. Financial  institutions  will become  extremely  cautious  about new lending  and the
process of  credit creation will further stagnate. This,  in  tum,  will dampen investment and
consumption  activities.  In the United  States,  economic  activities  will  also face dampening  pressure  as
Japanese  financial  institutions  sell off their bonds  and securities. Stock  prices  will fall and long-term
interest rates will rise.  Furthermore,  with the deepening  recession  in Japan, the demand for U.S.
exports will tumble. Finally, a concurrent  recession  in Japan and the United States (or weakened
growth of the U.S. economy)  and turmoil in the financial  sector will spread to other parts of the
world.'8
The relevant  question  is, therefore,  whether  the "Japan Problem"  is real. The consensus  is
that "Japan Problem"  represents  only a worst-case  scenario  - and not the most likely scenario  -
among  possible outcomes.  City banks reported  the highest  operating  profits in many years for the
period  April-September  1995 (thanks  to a widening  spread),  and have been aggressively  writing  off
bad loans. The size of bad debts limited  to city banks - banks  that have  access  to foreign  exchange
and possess foreign assets - is reported at about 23 trillion yen ($230 billion). This is not an
explosive  amount,  and the city banks  could  manage  it without  causing  a panic. Institutional  investors
such as life insurance  companies  continue  to invest  abroad, albeit on a smaller scale.  Overall,  the
Japanese financial  system is operating  normally, on a reduced scale, without any systemic  credit
crisis at this moment. The only  problem  is the continued  existence  of a large stock of nonperforming
loans and bad debts and a lack of consensus-based  policy actions on the part of the authorities  to
cope with this problem. As described  in earlier sections,  30 to 40 percent of total bad loans had
already been covered by mid  1995 with accelerated  transfers to  loan-loss reserves and with
liquidation  of bad debts through the CCPC.  As a result, the estimated  amount  of noncovered  bad
loans, including  problematic  loans made by Ju-Sens,  was reduced  to 18.3 trillion  yen ($183 billion)
by the end of September  1995. It is likely  that the authorities  will be eventually  forced  to mobilize
is  This phenomenon  is expected  to be happening  at a reduced  scale  even  if the Japanese  govermnent
manages  the  problems  of the  bad  debts  without  the  occurrence  of a systemic  financial  crisis.
12about 5 to 10 trillion  yen ($50 to $100 billion)  of public  funds  to protect deposits  and loans in small
financial  institutions  and Ju-Sens.' 9
The Bank of Japan has assets to enable it to  supply more than sufficient short-term
liquidity.  On the U.S. side, authorities  have already made preemptive  strikes against possible
negative  ripple effects  by showing  their  determination  to supply  short-term  liquidity  on demand. The
quick supply of liquidity  to  subsidiaries  of Japan's financial institutions (and to other affected
institutions)  through  purchase-back  of short-term  treasury bills  will alleviate  any liquidity  crisis and
minimie the negative  effects on longer-term  instruments  (bonds, securities),  thereby  keeping  long-
term interest  rates  relatively  unaffected.
V.  Public Sector Bailout - What Form Is It Likely To Take?
In view of the above discussion,  a systemic  financial crisis that has a serious effect on
world financial markets and the world economy  seems unlikely. However, it is not impossible,
particularly  if, as some  analysts  believe,  a sizable  number  of bad loans has not been reported. Even
ignoring  these possible additional  bad loans, there are looming  risks of a further devaluation  of
property  values  taken as collateral,  and of a possible  downturn  in the stock market that could  wipe
out latent gains. As Murashima's  calculation  suggests,  a lump sum write-off  of bad debts is not an
option,  since  it would  lower  the capital  adequacy  ratio to below  the BIS limit  in every  type  of deposit-
taking financial  institution  and make these institutions  inoperative.  Therefore,  it is imperative  that
there be an accelerated  write-off  against  the backbone  of an expanding  economy  and an introduction
of public  funds  for a bailout  of smaller  financial  institutions  and Ju-Sens  that lack the ability  to self-
generate  write-offs,  resulting  in higher  fiscal  expenditures  or fiscal  debt stock.
The very existence  of a large amount  of bad debt,  however,  has hindered  and will continue
to hinder  the creation  of new credit, and thus has a dampening  effect on economic  activities.  There
has been  no public  consensus  on whether  to introduce  public funds  for a bailout,  nor it is expected  in
the near future. Therefore  it is worthwhile  to construct  several  indicative  scenarios,  including  some
that involve a type of financial crisis and/or public bailout in line with the "Japan Problem"
arguments. In the following  paragraphs,  we briefly discuss  the form that a public sector bailout
would  be likely  to take, drawing  on past cases from other  countries. This will give some  rationale  to
the design  of the model-based  simulations  reported  in the next  section.
The recent cases of bailouts  by the public  sector  are sumnarized in Table 13. The size of
bailout (loss) ranges from 1.4 percent of GDP in the U.K. case to 7 percent in Finnish case.  In
Japan's case, if the authorities  try to cope  with the problem  in a decisive  manner,  the bailout would
likely cost as much as 2 percent of GDP, or about 10 trillion yen (US $100 billion), against an
estimated  18.3  trillion  yen in noncovered  bad loans. The likely  form of a publicly funded  bailout can
be inferred  in particular  from the recent  financial  sector  crises in the United  States  and Finland.
19  In Section  VI,  we  conduct  a simulation  for public  bailout,  assuning  the size  of the  bailout  at 2 percent
of GDP,  worth  about  10  trillion  yen ($100  billion)  in 1996  currency.
13Failures and subsequent  bailouts in the savings and loan (S&L) industry in the United
States  during  the 1980s  and early 1990s  present  a case  against  which  Japan's possible  financial  crisis
can be compared.  The total cost to U.S. taxpayers  of cleaning  up the savings  and loan debacle  was
estimated  in 1991  by the Congressional  Budget  Office  to be more  than $215 billion (Manchester  and
McKibbin,  1994).  In 1994  that estimate  was lowered  to about $150 billion  by the same office. The
bailout consisted  of the U.S. government  first issuing  implicit  guarantees  to cover  future losses  and
then  funding deposit  reimbursements.  Therefore, in  the  US.  case,  net  outlays  were financed
through an increase in public  expenditure and thus in the fiscal  deficit. The fiscal policy associated
with financing  the S&L failures  led to over-consumption  during the 1980s.  This over-consumption
resulted  in lower  private saving,  lower  physical  investrnent,  and lower  output  growth  for a number  of
years (Manchester  and McKibbin,  1994).
The Finnish banking crisis, which began in  1991, resulted in  large-scale  government
support operations  in the form of guarantees  aimed at strengthening  banks' balance  sheets, with a
number of nonperforming  loans in private institutions being taken over by the government  and
grouped  into  a new publicly  owned  company. In total, government  support  to the banking  sector  over
1991-94 amounted to some 15 percent of GDP, primarily  reflected in a direct rise in the level of
government debt rather in higher current expenditures (Barrell, Pain, and Morgan, 1995).
The most likely  bailout  in Japan would  involve  a mixture of these two experiences,  with an
injection  of public funds  into the official  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  established  in 1971,  which
has a legal commitment  to compensate  depositors  in insolvent  banks. The structure  and functions  of
the Japanese  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  are compared  in Table 14 to those of the U.S. Federal
Deposit Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC). Japan's Deposit Insurance  Corporation  does not take over
the assets or liabilities  of insolvent  banks,  nor does it monitor  ailing  financial  institutions. Therefore,
in addition to the injection  of  public funds through the Deposit Insurance Corporation, some
additional  debt-financed  purchase of banking sector assets by other entities  is highly likely (say,
through  the CCPC) in the event  of a Japanese  banking  crisis.
In fact, the government  and the Bank of Japan have already been helping  the insolvent
financial  institutions  with special  loans  or donations  from the Deposit  Insurance  Corporation.  Recent
loans are tabulated  in Table 12. The Bank of Japan as lender  of last resort has also made extensive
special  loans ("Nichigin  Tokuyu")  to save insolvent  or almost insolvent  financial  institutions  in the
latter half of 1995. Figure 14 portrays the Bank of Japan's recent special lending  activities, and
Figure 15 shows  the stock of outstanding  special loans ("Tokuyu")  and its increasing  share in total
outstanding  loans.
Studies of the economic  costs of the U.S. savings  and loan crisis (including  misallocated
capital  and the costs of the bailout)  suggest  that cumulative  GDP losses  could  be as high as 8 percent
between 1982 and 2007. Real long-term  interest rates were pushed an estimated  50 basis points
higher,  at their peak,  than they would  have been  otherwise  by the late 1980s,  and the U.S. dollar was
also 1.5  percent  stronger  than it would  have  been  otherwise. Given  the scale of the problem,  it seems
likely  that the economic  costs  of a crisis in Japan will also be large.  Growth  has averaged  only a little
over 1 percent  a year in 1991-95,  with real long-term  interest  rates averaging  only a little below  U.S.
rates and the real value of the yen surging  during  this period.  The fiscal costs of restructuring  would
add to the structural  deficit  that was built up by the effort  to combat  the recession.  This would add to
14the problem  of a less favorable  starting  point from which to confront  the problems  associated  with
population  aging  in the next  century.
From both the economic  and political  viewpoints,  the most controversial  issues confronting
the financial  sector are the financial  troubles  of the Ju-Sens and the public funding of any bailout.
Because  the use of public funds implies  an increase  in public  debt and in the future (or current)  tax
burden, it is difficult  to achieve  a national  consensus  to support ailing  financial  institutions.  On the
other  hand, the opportunity  cost of postponing  a decisive  set of policy  measures  to rapidly reduce  or
eliminate  nonperforming  loans has been  mounting.  The  time bomb is ticking.
VI. Model-Based  Simulations
This section presents results from a set of macroeconometric,  model-based  simulations
conducted  to investigate  likely effects  on both the Japanese  economy  and the rest of the world of
possible critical events in  the ailing Japanese financial sector. Because simulation results are
essentially  subject to model properties,  the aim of these simulations  is only to indicate possible
qualitative  responses  of major  macroeconomic  variables  to major  financial  sector  shocks,  and to draw
implications  about shock  diffusion  under  various  publicly  funded  bailout  schemes.
A.  The Model
This  study utilized the  fifth-generation  EPA World Economic Model  created and
maintained  by the Government  of Japan's Economic  Research  Institute of the Economic  Planning
Agency  for its simulations. This is basically  a demand-oriented,  Keynesian  model  with an IS-LM-BP
framework,  and is made  up of the following  submodels: 20
1)  three medium-sized  country  models  of the United  States, Japan, and Germany  (restricted  to the
former  West  Germany);
2)  six small-sized  country models  of France,  the United  Kingdom,  Italy, Canada, Australia, and
Korea;
3)  six regional models of Asia (excluding  Japan and Korea); Western Europe (excluding  the
countries  mentioned  above); Latin America;  the Middle East; the former Soviet Union and
Eastern  Europe;  and the rest of the  world;  and
4)  a trade linkage  model.
Our simulations  use the medium-  and small-sized  country  models  to predict the effects of
various policy options.  All models  employ  basically  the same specifications  in structural equations.
The entire system  contains 1,234 equations  (322 structural equations  and 912 identities),  the same
number  of endogenous  variables,  and 297 exogenous  variables.
20  For a detailed  exposition  of the model,  see "EPA  WORLD  ECONOMIC  MODEL  - Fifth Version,"
EPA  World Econometric Model Discussion Papers No.  20., Vols.  1 and 2, June  1995.
15The estimation  period  is from 1983  to 1992. The period  is limited  to ten years so that the
model reflects characteristics  of the most recent economic  structure.  The model has also been
restructured  from the original  EPA model  to some extent in order to capture the economic  dynamics
surrounding  the creation  and bursting  of the bubble. 2'
B.  Fall  in Land and Equity Pnces
As discussed in preceding sections, the financial sector problem in Japan is  deeply
connected  with the collapse in land and equity prices.22 Furthermore,  in the absence of major
publicly  funded  bailouts,  possible  bank runs would  force the sale of land and equities held by these
financial  institutions,  causing  a further  decline  in asset prices and exacerbating  the problem.'  With
this in mind,  simulations  were conducted  for the cases of 25 percent  asset price deflation  in land and
equities,  respectively.
The land price is defined  in the model  as the land value index  of residential  sections  in city
areas.  Its variation affects private consumption  and money demand (cash and time deposits, in
particular)  through changes  in the household  sector's net worth at the outset.  The equity price is
defined  as that in the Tokyo Stock Price Index, since  that reflects the market condition  better than
other  average  prices (e.g. Nikkei  225). Its forward  linkage  starts from  the price earnings  ratio (PER),
which influences  investment  decisions  of the corporate sector and is one of the crucial factors
determiniing  the user cost of capital (relating  to Tobin's q). The variation of the equity price also
directly  affects  the household  sector's net worth, and thus changes  consumption  pattems and money
demand  behavior.
Tables 15 and 16 collect  the computation  results from simulated  declines  in land  and equity
prices, respectively. Although  the percentage  decline  in prices is the same in both simulations  (25
percent  decline  from baseline  values),  the magnitude  of the impacts seems to differ greatly in these
two cases. This is due largely  to size  effects. Roughly  speaking,  the total value of land  property  was
21  The simulations  used  the period  1983  to 1992  for two  reasons. First,  EPA's  baseline  projections  were
strictly  confidential.  Second,  using this period  enabled  us to concentrate  on analyses  of the multiplier
process  rather  than speculating  on an arbitrary  baseline  forecast  that would  need  to be adjusted  in response
to financial  sector  developments  and policy  initiatives.
22  Collateral  banking  is the  typical  form  of bank  lending  in Japan.  The  custom  of using  land  as collateral
saves  evaluation  and monitoring  costs  as compared  to costs  under  project  banking. Japanese  banks  require
sufficient  land  property  as collateral,  particularly  in the  case  of loans  to small-  to medium-sized  enterprises.
23  Heavy  sales  of equities  by  financial  institutions,  however,  may  not be a likely  outcome  since  holdings
and cross-holdings  of equities  that involve  financial  institutions  are usually  structured  for a long-term
business  relationship  (Keiretsu).
16about three times larger than that of equities.24  The relatively low level of the aggregate equity values
in total  asset holdings partly  explains why  asset  operations by  the  official  funds  or  any  other
measures in support of equity prices-aimed  at assisting city banks to pass the BIS standard-could
have only a marginal effect on macroeconomic activities. 25 Apart from the differential size effects
and a slight difference in their channels of initial shock diffusion, sirnulated declines in asset prices
created similar qualitative responses.  These simulations single out the negative effects of asset price
deflation on the Japanese economy, for both land and equities, in the following manner:
1)  In both cases, declines in asset prices themselves would have depreciated the yen.  The rapid
appreciation of the yen during the first  8 months of 1993, which lengthened the business cycle
downturn, was caused mainly by the interest rate differential between the Japanese and  U.S.
economies. 26
2)  GDP  growth  stagnates  due  to  a  slowdown  in  domestic  absorption,  despite  the  positive
contribution from foreign sectors helped by currency depreciation.
3)  Stagnation in domestic absorption reduces money demand and therefore interest rates.  However.
massive deflation causes increases in real interest rates after the third or fourth year.
4)  Private consumption stagnates due to declines in disposable income and households' net worth.
Movements in real interest rates turn hostile to consumption activities the third or fourth year
following the  shock.  Declines in  private  consumption  are  generally  larger  than  those  in
disposable income due to negative wealth effects, and the household saving rate increases when
dissaving is preferable to stimulating an ailing economy.  27
24  For comparison  purposes,  the impacts can be size adjusted  using SNA statistics (see Table 1).  From
April 1991  to October 1993,  equity  prices declined  by 56.4 percent in real terms and the ratio of real capital
loss to the GDP  was 0.95. On the other hand, land prices declined  by 30.9 percent  during the same  period in
real terms and the ratio of real capital loss to the C-DP  was 1.55. This implies that the total value of land
property  was about three times larger than that of equities.  Thus, the impact of a 75 percent decline in
equity  prices  should, roughly  speaking,  be directly  comparable  to that of a 25 percent decline  in land prices.
A decline  in land prices should,  in principle,  have two  different  and opposite  effects:  the aforementioned
negative  effects  on credit creation, and positive  effects through declines in producers' costs where land is
used as an input. The model  captures  the negative  effects successfully  but not the positive  effects,  and thus
tends  to overestimate  the impact of land price deflation.
25  Measures taken in support of equity prices would normally drag down Japan's export growth by
appreciating  its currency.
26  This, in turn, was a product  of desynchronized  business  cycles  and opposite  stances  in monetary  policies
in Japan  and the United States. The United States reached  the peak of its last cycle  in 1989 and a trough  in
1991.  As a result, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board guided interest rates lower during this period (see
footnote  6) while  the Japanese  monetary  authority  took  a tighter  policy  stance  to cope  with the bubble.
27  Ogawa,  et al., (1994b)  analyzed  the effects  of variation  in household  assets  on consumption  behavior  in
the recent  Japanese  context. His study  found  strong  causality  from values of liquidity  assets  to consumption
activities,  particularly  in household  expenditures  on clothing  and housing.
175)  Growth  slows in both housing  and business  fixed investments  as income  growth stagnates. An
increase  in real interest  rates further  drags down  housing  investment  in later years. A decline  in
PER further  stagnates  business  investment  by increasing  the cost of capital.
6)  Stagnation in domestic  demand  results in lower import demand.  The declines  in imports of
energy  and raw materials  are smaller  than those in manufactured  goods. This is due mainly  to
higher  income  elasticity  attached  to import  demand  for manufactured  items. 2'
7)  With exports  receiving  a positive  boost from currency  depreciation,  the trade and current  account
surplus  widens.  The increased  current  account  surplus  can be decomposed  into  decreasing  public
sector  -savings  (due to reduced  tax revenue)  and increasing  private sector savings,  as described
above, which  outweighs  the decrease  in public sector  savings.
8)  Foreign  direct investment  gradually  increases  in spite of the depreciating  yen. Movements  in the
relative (nominal)  interest rate (the U.S./Japan  in the current model) turn out to be the more
dominant factor. Investmnent  funds tend to  go abroad in  search of  profitable investrnent
opportunities.
For the effects on the rest of the world (tabulated  only for land prices), the simulations
indicated  slower  world  trade growth  and declines  in export  prices of commodities  and manufactured
goods, with the terms of trade turning against commodity  exporters (and manufactured  goods
importers). Export growth in every developing  region  slowed in these simulations."  In the U.S.
market, with assumptions  of neutral fiscal and monetary policies (policy variables were fixed at
respective  baseline  values),  growth  slowed  as exports lagged  due to both stagnant Japanese  import
demand  and appreciation  of the dollar. U.S. import demand  was simulated  to increase despite  the
growth slowdown since the positive effects through exchange rate appreciation outweighed  the
negative  income  factor. Short-term  interest  rates declined  in both nominal  and real terms. Real long-
term rates declined  marginally  in the initial  years but increased  at the end of the simulation  period.
As a result, developing  regions  were forced  to face higher  real long-term  rates on top of the negative
effects  of decreased  trade volumes  combined  with deterioration  (in the case of commodity  exporters)
in the terns of trade.
28  Income  and price  elasticity  to imports  are:
| Price  elasticity  Income  elasticity
Aggregate  import  -0.35  1.26
Oil and other  energy  -0.03  0.88
Food  and raw  material  -0.30  0.85
Manufacturing  products  -0.84  2.13
For exposition  of the recent  increase  in merchandise  imports,  reflecting  structural  changes  in Japanese
markets,  see  Otsubo  (1996)  and  Kawasaki  and  Tsutsumni  (1996).
29  The only  exception  is Latin America's  export  growth  in later  years.  where a boost  in export  price
competitiveness  (Latin  America's  export  prices  relative  to those  of competitors)  is simulated  to outweigh  the
slowdown  in effective  export  market  growth.
18C  FYnanclal  Sector  Crisis  and Bailouts
Although  the possibility  of a systemic  financial  sector  crisis is unlikely,  as discussed  earlier,
simulation  analyses  for limited-scale  bank runs and subsequent  publicly  funded  bailouts are still of
great interest. The runs observed  at the Kizu and Cosmo  credit  unions and at other  regional  banks in
the latter half of 1995,  and the mounting  problems  of ailing  Ju-Sens (mortgage  institutions)  in 1996,
have given  rise to the fear of a financial  sector  crisis.
1.  Scenario  Design
A limited-scale  bank run worth  about 2 percent  of nominal  GDP is assumed  at the outset  of
the crisis. The size of the initial shock was chosen  arbitrarily to necessitate  about 10 trillion yen
($100 billion)  worth of public funds infusion  (evaluated  at the 1996 price level) to cope with the
short-term  liquidity  crisis. 30 The simulation  assumes  that the withdrawn  deposits will be added to
cash hoarding  by the household  sector-money  under  the bed--during  the crisis rather  than redeposited
in other,  less vulnerable  financial  institutions.  An initial simulation  with no public involvement  was
conducted  to show  the necessity  of the monetary  and fiscal authorities'  involvement  at the advent of
the crisis.  Subsequent  simulations  represent  the cases of bailout by public funds with and without
particular  forms  of financing  for the increased  public  debt  stock.
The following  scenarios  were  tested:
Scenario  1 (SlJ)-Runs without  Bailouts
Bank runs occur. Money  worth 2 percent  of nominal  GDP is drawn from demand  deposit  accounts
at financial institutions  and is added to the household  sector's cash hoarding. The added cash
hoarding  stays as money  under the bed throughout  the simulation  period. No accommodation  of
short-term  liquidity  by the monetary  authority  is assumed. Thus, the stock of high-powered  money  is
kept  constant  and interest  rates  respond  endogenously  to market  forces.
Scenario  2 (52)-Public Bailout  Financed  by Increased  Fiscal  Debt Stock
The Bank of Japan intervenes  and supplies  liquidity  to keep short-term  interest  rates constant (at the
baseline  level). The fiscal  authority  bears the burden  of liquidity  creation  by issuing  bonds  to provide
credit-side  items  in the central  bank's balance  sheet. 3'  The level of fiscal debt stock increases  by the
same amount. This strong showing  of the public sector's determination  to cope with the liquidity
squeeze  restores  the household  sector's confidence  in the financial  sector,  and this causes redepositing
30  See  discussions  in Section  V for  the  rationale  of choosing  a crisis  of  this size.
31  The  central  bank's  direct  underwriting  of  government  bond  issues  is prohibited  in a strict  sense. Under  a
crisis situation,  this setup is used to approximate  the monetary  authority's  liquidity  supply  (Nichigin
Tokuyu),  coupled  with  the fiscal  authority's  burden  sharing  through  increases  in fiscal  spending  and/or  in
debt  stock.
19of withdrawn  cash in financial institutions  by the start of the third year after the initial runs. 32
Accumulated  issues  of bonds  during  the first two years amount  to 10 trillion  yen ($100  billion)  at the
1996  price level.
Scenario  3 (S3)-Public Bailout Financed  by Cuts in Public  Investment  Expenditure
Government  reduces  investment  expenditures  to improve  fiscal balance  and regain baseline  levels  of
debt stock. The size and pattern of reductions  are identical  to those of required  bond issues in the
first two years after the crisis.
Scenario 4 (S4)-Public  Bailout Financed by Temporarily  Increased Taxes on the Household
Sector
Government  increases  taxes on the household  sector  to finance  the bailout. The size and pattern of
initial exogenous  tax increases  are identical  to those of required  bond issues in the first two years
after the onset of the crisis. The tax increase  is for only two years and is described  as a temporary
measure.  Despite the household sector's  reluctance to  finance a  bailout of ailing financial
institutions,  economists  regard some form of burden sharing by that sector as necessary for an
ultimate  solution  to the financial  sector  problem.
Scenario  S (55)-Public Bailout Financed  by Increased  Taxes  on the  Household  Sector
Same as Scenario  4 except that the increased  tax burden is spread out throughout  the simulation
period. This is considered  a more  expectation-neutral  policy.
2.  Effeds  on the Japanese Economy
Figure 16 summarizes  the simulated  effects  of the scenarios  on the Japanese  economy. If
the monetary  authority  does not supply short-term  liquidity  at the advent  of runs (Scenario 1), the
Japanese  economy  falls into an abrupt recession  with a downward  deflationary  spiral.  Under this
scenario,  as the financial  sector  ceases  to function  as an intermediary  for credit creation,  money  stock
(M2)  in the economy  declines  sharply  and remains  2.5 to 3 percent  lower  than the baseline  even  in the
longer  run. Real long-term  interest  rates rise as much  as 80 basis  points and do not come  down  to the
baseline  level. Accordingly,  the level  of fixed  business  investment  declines  and stays more  than a full
percentage  point lower than in the base case, even at the end of the simulation  period.  Private
consumption  tumbles  and also does  not return  to the baseline  level. The general  government  balance
worsens as tax revenues  decline,  while  the recession  continues  without any recovery  in sight. The
current account  balance  also worsens,  albeit  to a lesser degree,  despite  reduced  import  demand. This
is  due to  stagnation in  exports caused by  lackluster world trade activity and  loss of  price
competitiveness  as the yen appreciates  as much as 4 percent  in the short term and 5 percent after a
decade  (Figure 17).  A slight  worsening  of the current  account  balance,  coupled  with a larger increase
in the general  government's  deficit,  implies  a rising savings  ratio in the private sector. This seems
32  Scenario  1.5 (S1.5)  is created  as a reference  point. In this simulation,  the automatic  return of
withdrawn  cash  to banks'  demand  deposit  accounts  is assumed  without  any  form  of  bailout.
20reasonable  given  the aforementioned  cash hoarding  by the household  sector. 33 Under  this scenario  of
runs without  bailouts, land prices continue  to fall, adding  to the deflationary  spiral.  Equity prices
also fall as much  as 15 percent  by the end of the third  year and recover  only to a level 5 percent  lower
than the  base case.
Figure 17 tracks developments  in Japan's import demand  and foreign direct investment.
Under Scenario 1, aggregate  import demand  in Japan declines gradually and stays at a level 1.5
percent  lower  than the baseline  case despite  the yen's appreciation. Although  oil imports  recover  by
the end of the decade,  imports  of raw materials  and manufactured  goods  remain  depressed. Given  its
high income  elasticity,  imports  of manufactured  goods tumble furthest and stay at a level about 3
percent  lower  that the base case (see footnote  28). The stock of FDI, however,  increases  by about 2
percent  at the end of the simulation  period after declining  as much as 2 percent in the first several
years after the initial shock. The positive  effects  of an appreciation  of the yen and an increase  in the
relative profitability of  foreign investment  (caused by  the interest rate  differential) gradually
overcome  the negative  effects  of depressed  profit  levels  in the business  sector.
Simulation  results under Scenario I indicate the necessity of the monetary authority's
intervention. With the monetary  authority  supplying  sufficient  liquidity  to keep short-term  interest
rates from rising in the initial two years of the shock (and with the assumption  of the return of
hoarded  money  to financial  institutions),  the recessionary  effects of the runs are largely mitigated.
Under  Scenario  2, production  recovers  to the baseline  level  five  years after the shock  and continues  to
oscillate  only slightly  thereafter. Real long-term  interest  rates come  down  to the baseline  level by the
fourth year and stay close to the baseline  level thereafter. CPI declines  only gradually and by no
more  than 0.5 percent  in the long  run.
Calculations  for Scenario  2 show that intervention  financed  by an increase  in fiscal debt
stock can bring economic  activity back to a  baseline level and largely dampen business cycle
oscillations. However,  the permanently  increased  fiscal debt stock and the resultant higher real
interest rates projected  for the decade after the simulation  period should be dealt with by further
policy initiatives.  Quick-fix,  short-term cuts in public investment  expenditure  (Scenario 3) or
increases  in tax collection  from the household  sector (Scenario  4)-made  concurrently  with the issue
of government  bonds  during  the initial  two years of the shock-bring production  back to the baseline
level  a little more  quickly  and mitigate  the abrupt  worsening  of the fiscal  balance  during  the first two
years.  However,  these policies  exacerbate  the downturn  in economic  activity in the first two years
and continue  to amplify  business  cycle  movements  in the economy.  After a slight  depreciation  of the
yen for the first several  years, these  shock  policies  bring persistent  appreciation  of the yen against  the
baseline  level, thus hurting  the price competitiveness  of Japanese  exports for years to come. This
strong appreciation of the yen for several years after enactment of such policies is  due to
differentiated  movements  in U.S./Japan  real long-term  interest rates and the current account surplus
accumulated  during  the initial  several  years, which,  in turn, is caused  by a huge decline  in domestic
import  demand. Naturally,  between  these two abrupt short-term  policy actions,  initial declines  and
33  Thus, the phenomenon  of overconsumption  detected  in Manchester  and McKibbin  (1994)  is not
replicated  under  the  current  simulation  framework.  Fixed  investment  is nonetheless  discouraged,  adding  to
the  loss  of production  and  productivity.
21cycle amplification  are larger under Scenario 3 than under Scenario 4,  where cuts in  public
investment  directly reduce domestic  demand. Under scenarios  3 and 4, Japan's import demand
declines much more drastically, even compared with  the scenario of  runs without rescues.
Furthermore,  in these scenarios  the shock treatments  do not visibly improve  the fiscal balance in
subsequent  years.
Scenario  5 represents  a fairly expectation-neutral,  gradual remedy  to the increased fiscal
debt stock  used to finance  the rescue  with public  funds. With the household  sector bearing  the main
burden  of the financial  sector  bailout  in a gradual  and persistent  manner,  an economic  recession  after
the runs can be largely  avoided,  and later business  cycle oscillations  are eliminated  almost entirely.
Cyclical  exchange  rate appreciation  is within  a mere one percent  range  under Scenario  5. Movements
in macroeconomics  variables under this scenario  show only a slight  degree  of worsening  during the
current  simulation  period  as compared  to those under Scenario  2-the  scenario  that put the burden of
financing  on future  generations. Comparing  movements  in real long-term  interest rates and general
government  deficits  (and therefore  in fiscal  debt stock), Scenario  5 represents  gradual but persistent
improvement  over Scenario  2.
3.  Effects on the World  Economy and on the Developing  Regions
The  effects  of Japan's financial  sector  crisis and subsequent  bailouts  on the world economy
can be inferred  from  the presented  movements  in Japan's import  demand,  real interest rates, exchange
rates, and the stock of foreign  direct investment  by Japanese  residents. Figure 18 shows  movements
in  major macroeconomic  variables in  the  United States economy under  various  scenarios
implemented  in the Japanese  economy. The  policy variables  in the U.S. economy  are exogenous  and
kept  at the baseline  levels  throughout  the simulation  exercise.
Under  Scenario  I (bank  runs without  bailouts  in Japanese  economy),  the U.S. GDP initially
rises rather  than declines  as the foreign  sector  contributes  positively. Rapid  depreciation  of the dollar
(appreciation  of the yen) decreases  import  demand  while  growth of exports slows only marginally.
Although  Japanese  import demand  and world  trade activity  stagnate,  the decline  in U.S. exports is
minimal  since its economy  becomes  more price competitive  thanks to currency  depreciation. Real
interest rates that do not rise during the initial years of expansion in domestic production are
conducive  to higher  domestic  absorption. Japan's equity prices  decline  as much  as 15 percent while
its currency  appreciates  only  by 4 percent. Investment  funds,  therefore,  head  toward the U.S. market,
pushing  up equity and bond prices  and applying  downward  pressure on yields.34 Thus,  the widely
feared contagious effects of Japan 's  financial crisis (of a limited scale) to the US  financial  market
are not detected in this simulation.  U.S. domestic  production  activity starts to slow after several
years  of expansion  as interest  rates rise and imports  recover.
34  Corporate  bond  average  yield  (Moody  AAA)  is used  as the long-term  interest  rate.  Widely  feared
withdrawal  of funds  by Japan's financial  institutions  from the U.S. and other  markets  is not taken into
account,  since  a more  plausible  assumption  is that the Japanese  monetary  authority  will provide  short-term
liquidity,  as postulated  in Scenario  2.
22Under Scenarios  2 and 5, the U.S. economy  follows  the pattern of Scenario 1, but in a
much less severe  manner and with shorter cycles for key macroeconomic  variables.  However, it
shows a different  reaction  pattern to Japan's publicly funded financial  sector bailout with abrupt
policies  to finance  the increased  fiscal debt (scenarios  3 and 4).  As Japan's import demand and
world trade activity abruptly  slow down  and the yen/dollar  exchange  rate behaves  much differently
(with  the yen depreciating  in the early years instead  of appreciating)  than in scenarios  3 and 4, U.S.
exports decline  rapidly while imports grow.  Accordingly,  the U.S. GDP stagnates under these
scenarios. Decreased  money  demand  and declining  real interest rates in the U.S. and a rising real
long-term  interest  rate in Japan create  a sharp appreciation  of the yen (depreciation  of the dollar)  in
the later years of simulation,  causing  abrupt changes  in trade activity.  In terms of both net effects  on
domestic  production  and macroeconomic  stability,  Scenario  5 (financing  of the increased  fiscal debt
stock through gradual  and persistent  taxation  of the household  sector)  is preferred  over scenarios  3
and 4 (abrupt  changes  in public  investment  expenditure  or taxes on the household  sector).
Figure 19 shows  the movements  in world  trade and trade prices under various scenarios.
As implied  in the preceding  paragraphs,  world  trade is depressed  by the bank runs in Japan (Scenario
1).  World  trade activity  does  not recover  to the baseline  level  if rescue  action is not taken by Japan's
public authorities. Although  pattems of reactions  in world commodity  prices and export prices of
industrial  countries  differ  widely  under various  scenarios  once  Japan's financial  sector  crisis occurs,
terms of trade generally  tum against primary comrnodity-dependent  exporters regardless  of  the
specific  form of bailout.
If abrupt policies  are enacted  under scenarios  3 and 4, the level of world trade stagnates
and terms  of trade (for commodity  exporters)  deteriorate  even  more in the initial years of the crisis.
Again,  policies under Scenario  5 are preferred to those under scenarios 3 and 4, particularly  for
developing  regions.
Economic  activity  in the rest of the world seems  to benefit  more  if Japan bails out its ailing
financial  sector by simply  mobilizing  public funds without  financing  the bailout (Scenario  2).  The
negative  effects  of higher  fiscal debt stock and failing  fiscal consolidation  in Japan do not seem  to
show up during this simulation  period. However,  the longer-term  implications  might as well be
negative  since real long-term  interest rates are higher in both Japanese and U.S. markets under
Scenario  2 than Scenario  5.
Analyzing further the trade-transmitted  ripple effects of  Japan's  financial crisis on
developing  regions,  the volume  effects are generally  more  negative  if their export bundles  contain a
higher  share of manufactured  goods-as  shown  in Japan's import  behavior  by categories  of goods-
and if a large share of their exports is directed  to the markets  with greater declines  in import  demand
(Japan, in particular). The higher the share of primary commodities  in its export bundle and of
manufactured  goods  in its import  bundle  the more  negative  will be the price effects (deterioration  in
terms  of trade) on a developing  region.
To illustrate  the point,  figures 20 and 21 show movements  in export  volume  growth,  terms
of trade, export price competitiveness  (export prices relative to those of competitors),  and trade
balances for Asia and Latin America,  respectively. Asia's export volume is simulated  to stagnate
and does not recover under Scenario 1, while Latin America's export volume stays virtually
23unaffected  in the initial years and then increases  relative  to its baseline level  toward the end of the
simulation  period. In the event of drastic measures  under scenarios  3 and 4, Asia's exports  tumble
early on and then regain  the baseline  level after a decade.  Although  they decline  slightly  in the first
couple of years, Latin America's exports are simulated  to recover quickly  and exceed the baseline
level. This difference  in simulated  reaction  pattems seems  to be created  by differences  in the regions'
export  bundles,  trade ties with Japan, and the degree  to which  their currencies  are linked  to the U.S.
dollar. The simulated  pattems of movements  in intemational  price competitiveness  are quite similar
for the two regions across scenarios, but with a slight edge for Latin America throughout the
simulation  period.
Tuming to the simulated  movements  in terms of trade, Asia has a clear advantage  over
Latin America. The share of manufactured  goods  in Asia's export  bundle  was 82 percent in 1994,
while  Latin America's  was 55  percent in the same year.  Asia is more of a manufactures  exporter
(less of commodity  exporter)  than  Latin America. Generally  speaking,  the initial worsening  of terms
of trade is mitigated  and/or  tumed around more  quickly  for Asia in every  scenario  tested. Terms of
trade for Asia regain  the baseline  level  under all the scenarios, while  Latin America's do not regain
the baseline  level at all under scenarios I and 4.  Particularly  under Scenario 1, Latin America's
terms of trade persist at a deteriorated  level.  As a result, while changes  in trade balance show
cyclical  patterns across baseline  values in the case of Asia, the balance continues  to deteriorate  in
Latin  America,  despite  higher  export  volumes  relative  to baseline  levels.35
Although  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and other  primary  commodity  exporters  are not grouped  into
particular  regional  modules  in the simulation  system,  the probable  effects  of Japan's financial  sector
crisis on these regions can be inferred from the preceding findings.  Their export volume growth
should be negatively  affected  by the overall stagnation  in world trade. Although  commodity  trade
volume  is less sensitive  to income  and output  variations,  declines  are inevitable  at the outset of the
Japanese  financial  sector  crisis. In the early 1990s,  the share of manufactured  goods  in Sub-Saharan
Africa's  export bundle was  only  about  19  percent. Effects on  their  international price
competitiveness,  however, would be largely mitigated because of the weaker connection  of the
region's currencies  to the U.S. dollar. Even if there are some movements  in price competitiveness,
import  demand  for primary  commodities  is much  less  price sensitive  than for manufactured  products.
The negative  terms of trade changes should, therefore, be the most significant  overall effects of
Japan's financial  sector  crisis on these  primary  commodity-dependent  regions.
Nominal  interest  rates (both short and long term) shoot up at the beginning  of the crisis in
Japan's financial sector (Scenario 1).  Real interest rates increase and stay at the higher level in
Japan.  After a slight  delay, real rates also increase in the U.S. market. Therefore,  the world will
experience  higher  interest rates. Highly  indebted  nations  will pay higher  financing  costs, and those
with high shares in yen-denominated  debt will bear an  additional burden due to  the strong
appreciation  of the yen.  Mounting  fiscal debt stock in Japan-the  world largest net supplier of
35  The observed  phenomenon  also depends  partially  on the region's  import  behavior  under changing
export  earnings.  Since  import  capacity  tends  to be binding  in Latin  America  while  it is not the  critical  factor
in many  East Asian  economnies,  reactions  in import  demand  differ  between  the two regions,  even  given  a
similar  downturn  in exports  (see  Otsubo,  1996).
24capital-will  hurt prospects  for future capital supply,  particularly  when coupled  with the projected
rapid aging  of the Japanese  population  in the coming  decades.
4.  Is East Asia a Likely Loserfrom  a FYnanckal  Crsis In Japan?
As described  in the previous  subsection,  the simulation  shows  Asia's export  and production
activity  negatively  and strongly  affected  because  of its close  ties with Japan. The regional  module  for
Asia in the EPA world  economic  model,  however, also includes  the economies  of South Asia. This
subsection,  which deals  with East Asia alone,  presents  evidence  of East Asia's projected  robustness
at the advent  of Japan's financial  crisis.
Figures  22 and 23 show deviations  between  actual and estimated  (using model equations)
movements  in Japan's imports of primary commodities  and manufactured  goods.  While model-
produced  estimates  of primary commodity  imports  generally  continue  to track actual movements,
those of manufactured  imports exhibit persistent and widening  underestimation  after  1993.  As
Otsubo  (1996)  has shown,  ongoing  structural  adjustment  in the Japanese  economy  after the bursting
of the bubble and the yen's rapid appreciation,  with an increasing  degree of exchange  rate pass-
through due to deregulation,  resulted in larger penetration  of imported manufactured  goods into
Japan's market. This increase  in manufactured  imports  has been  taking  place despite  sluggish  output
growth in a pseudo-crisis  situation. Otsubo's study also concluded  that Japan's market opening  to
manufactured  goods would continue even under a  more serious scenario of  financial sector
breakdown  and renewed  recession. The study cited the following  factors in support of continuous
penetration  of imported  manufactured  goods  into  Japan's markets:
*  to stay price competitive,  domestic  manufacturers  are likely  to continue  increasing  their reliance
on imported  parts and materials;
- goods  are increasingly  produced  outside  at lower  cost and will be imported  back to support  the
society's  shift to lower-cost  production  and living;
- this trend is compatible  with the projected  shift in Japan's saving/investment  differentials  and its
decreasing  trade surplus  due to the aging  of its population.
Table 17 shows  manufactured  good categories  where Japan's import growth continued  to
be robust even after bursting of the bubble. It also shows growth  rates of these imports  from East
Asia, both as a  regional aggregate  and from individual  manufactures  exporters.  In all of the
manufactured  good categories  where Japan's imports grew by more than 10 percent a year on
average, during 1991-94,  East Asia recorded  higher  export growth into the Japanese  market than
other regions and gained market share.  Given the high share of manufactured  goods in its export
bundle  - this share increased  from 56 percent in 1982  to 84 percent in 1994 - and the expanding
production  network of Japanese corporations  in the region, manufactures  exporters  in East Asia
should  be able to weather  the financial  crisis in Japan very  well.
The stock of Japan's foreign  direct investment  (FDI) is simulated  to decline  initially  under
every  scenario  tested. However,  with bailouts, the effects  turn positive  in the third or fourth year,
regardless  of the financing  options. Even  without  bailouts,  the level  of FDI stock is higher  at the end
25of the simulation  period  after a sharp decline  in the initial  years. Declining  investment  opportunities
in the domestic  market,  higher  returns in the foreign  relative  to the domestic  market,  and appreciation
of the yen are the underlying  forces for strong  recovery  in Japan's FDI.  East Asia is considered  the
largest  beneficiary  of this development.
VII.  Concluding  Remarks
The bursting of the Japanese financial bubble in the early 1990s and the subsequent
continuing  decline  in asset prices have contributed  to an increase in bad debts for the country's
financial  institutions,  slowed  credit  extension  through  erosion  of the capital  base, and been a drag on
attempts  to produce a full recovery.  Since  Japan accounts  for about 20 percent of foreign aid to
developing  countries  and buys around 10 percent of their exports, its economic  health is obviously
important for the prospects of developing  regions.  This paper revisited the macroeconomic
environment  pertaining  to the creation  and bursting  of the financial  bubble,  provided  quantitative  and
qualitative  assessments  of the prevailing  bad debt stock among the ailing financial sectors, and
analyzed  their negative  effects  on the economy. The study further investigated  the risk of Japanese
financial  institutions  failing to meet BIS capital adequacy  criteria and policy options for Japan's
monetary  and fiscal  authorities.
Although  the possibility of a  systemic  financial sector crisis that will shake up world
financial markets - the so-called "Japan Problem" - is unlikely,  the authorities may have to
restructure  severely  affected  institutions,  with or without  the advent of an explicit financial  sector
crisis (bank runs), something  which  could result  in higher  fiscal expenditures  or an increase  in debt
stock.
To investigate  the likely effects  of the financial  sector crisis (limited-scale  bank runs) we
conducted scenario simulation  analyses using the Economic  Planning Agency's fifth generation
global macroeconometric  modeling  framework. Even with  limited-scale  bank runs equivalent  to 2
percent of nominal  GDP, loss of household  sector confidence  in the financial  sector would put the
Japanese  economy  into a recessionary  spiral. The simulation  showed  that the economy  would  never
revert  to the baseline  level  without  supplies  of short-term  liquidity  by the monetary  authority. Thus,
some  sort of publicly  funded  rescue  is regarded  as inevitable  under  this scenario.
At the advent of the crisis in Japan's financial  sector, world trade activity is depressed,
interest  rates are raised,  and the terms of trade generally  turn against  primary commodity  exporting
developing  regions. However,  the widely  feared  contagious  effects  of Japan's financial  crisis on the
U.S. and other major financial  markets  was not detected  in the simulation. This confirmed  that an
all-out,  doomsday  scenario  is unlilkely.
Even  with a limited  financial  sector  crisis, however,  the envisioned  changes  would  force  the
pace of Japan's structural adjustment  to accelerate,  causing  the economic  pain associated  with rapid
adjustments. As to the ripple  effects  outside  the country,  many  Asian economies  could, surprisingly,
turn out to be beneficiaries,  while industrial countries  and the financial centers of Asia will feel
liquidity  pressures  and the effect  of higher  interest  rates.
26Worst affected would be highly indebted,  primary commodity  exporting countries and
regions. Countries  in this group would  be unable  to place their current exports  to Japan in another
market.  Nor would they benefit  from Japan's opening  of its import  markets to consumer  goods. In
addition to the negative  volume effects, terms of trade would shift against the primary product
exporters. Higher short- and long-term  interest rates would increase  the debt financing  burden of
already heavily indebted  economnies.  Those with high shares in yen-denominated  debt stock would
suffer  additionally  due to appreciation  of the  yen.
Scenario  analyses  show that the negative  domestic  and foreign  ripple effects could largely
be contained  and the subsequent  business  cycle oscillations  mitigated  once the monetary authority
steps in to supply  short-term  liquidity  (with the government  issuing  bonds  to support the operation)
sufficient  to keep short-term  interest  rates from rising  in the initial  two years of the crisis. However,
the fiscal  authority  must be careful  in its implementation  of further  policies  to cope  with the increased
fiscal debt stock resulting  from the rescue.  Any abrupt changes  in fiscal expenditure  or in tax
collection  would  amplify  the shock,  hurt world  trade, and force developing  regions  to bear a heavier
burden  of adjustments. Small  but persistent  increases  in tax collection  from the Japanese  household
sector appear to be the most promising  option for financing the bailout, provided that public
acceptance could be  gained.  This policy, being fairly expectation neutral, would minimize
macroeconomic  instability and loss of efficiency  and preserve future productivity  growth in the
economy.
Regardless  of these scenarios,  and even without the trigger of a financial sector crisis,
coping  with financial  sector  problems  will leave  the Japanese  economy  in a less favorable  position  to
confront  the problems  associated  with an aging  population. Low-income  countries  are likely  to be
affected  by fiscal pressures  on Japanese  foreign  aid.  Although  many East Asian exporters of low-
cost manufactures  to Japan may be relatively  unaffected,  both short- to medium-term  gainers and
losers  alike  would  face longer  run negative  effects  through  continuously  higher  interest  rates due to a
heightened  risk premium  and a smaller  supply  of long-term  capital  from Japan,  caused  by a decline  in
the Japanese aggregate saving rate. The simulations lead to a  conclusion  that early, and even
preemptive,  enactment  of consensus-based,  publicly funded rescues in Japan's threatened  financial
sector provide the best hope of brighter prospects for the developing  regions as they undertake
outward-oriented  market  reforms  in the coming  decades.
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28[TABLES]
Table 1:  Capital Gains and Losses in Land and Stock
Stock Price  LAnd  Price
Total Value  Ratio to GDP  Total Value  Ratio to GDP  Growth Rate of TOPIX  Growth Rate of
(trillion yen)  (trillion Yen)  (percent)  Official Land Price
tff
1985  34  0.11  77  0.24  14.9  2.6
S6  121  0.36  255  0.76  48.3  7.7
87  76  0.22  415  1.19  10.9  21.7
88  177  0.47  170  0.45  36.6  8.3
89  194  0.49  299  0.75  22.2  16.6
90  -307  -0.72  231  0.54  -39.8  11.3
91  -5  -0.01  -189  -0.41  -1.1  -4.6
92  -188  -0.3S  -229  -0.49  -23.7  -8.4
93  4  0.01  -71  -0.15  10.1  -5.6
94  48  0.10  40  -0.08  8.3  -3.0
Notes: 1. Capital gains and losses are based on adjustnent account of SNA. A negative sign  represents loss.
2. TOPIX is as of year end. Official land price is as of Jan. 1.
Table 2:  Decline Rates in Stock and Land Prices
Nov. 1973-March 1975  April 1991-Oct  1993
| afir  first oil crisis)  (afer the bubble burst_
Stock  prices  a
Nominal decline rates  -30.9%  -53.6%
Real decline  rates  -45.4%  -56.4%
Real capital loss (ratio to GDP) b  0.21  0.95
LAnd  prices
Nominal decline rates  -6.8%  -27.5%
Real decline rates  -32.7%  -30.9%
Real capital loss (ratio to GDP) b  0.83  1.55
Source: K Ohta and N. Kasuga (1995).
Notes:  a. Based on TOPDC
b. Real decline rate x (total value / nominal GDP).
29Table 3:  Details of Bad Loans
(End of Sept  1995, 100 mnillion  yen)
Major  21 banks*  Other  institutions  2  Total
_onperforniing _oans  a  129,710  114,590.).
Covered by collateral  b  47,993  42,398  90,390
Covered by special reserve account  48,820  20,770  69,590
Unresolved  32,897  51,422  A.84,320
Re-ti  tured low  c  103,890  25,710
Retrctre  1l68,48
Restructued  loans except loans  to "Ju-Sens" d  - 68,480
Normalized  e  - 34,240
Covered by  ollateral2,669
_  To be non-perfonning  _  B.21,570
_  Restructured  loans  to "Ju-Sens"  -61,120
Total bad  loans  233,600  140,30( _  _
Assets possibly  to be tured  into losses  held by  Ju-Sens'  C.77,001
Sum of "unresolved amount" for deposit-taking  financial institutions (A+B+C): 182,890.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Notes:  1 City banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks.
*2 Regional  banks and other deposit-taking  financial institutions.
a. Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans.
b. Covering  rate is estimated  to be 370/.
c. Loans for which interests  have been reduced to a level below the official discount rate.
d. Housing loan companies.
e. 50% of restructured loans is expected to be normalized  (except loans  to "Ju-Sens").
Table 4:  Bad Loans Held by Deposit-Taking Financial  Institutions
End of SepL 1995, 100 mnillion  Yen)
Bad loans  Allowance  for doubtfiWl  debts
Total  Nonperforning  Restructured  Total  Special reserve
l__  __  __  __  __  ___  __  __  __  __  I  J  loans* I  _  o_ kS*_  2  account
Major 21 banks  233,600  129,710  103,890  61,670  48,820
City banks  130,940  80,580  50,360  41,790  32,730
Long-term credit banks  39,700  21,160  18,540  10,380  8,420
Trut  banks  62,960  27,970  34,990  9,500  7,670
Regional banks  77,350  54,960  22,390  18,680  12,840
Regional banks I  49,460  32,880  16,580  12,680  8,450
Regional banks ll  27,890  22,080  5,810  6,000  4,390
Other finanal  institutions  62,950  59,630  3,320  15,180  7,930
Total  373,900  244,3001  129,600  95,530  69,590
Source:  Ministry of Finance
Notes:  ILoans  to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans.
*
2 Loans for which interest has been reduced to a level below the official discount rate.
Table 5:  Ratio of Restructured Loans to Total Loans
End ofSepL 1995, 100 million yen)
Total asset  B. Restructured  B / A
|  A.  Total  loans  |  loans  pe  t
Major 21 banks  7,704,790  3,906,220  103,890
City banks  4,322,990  2,746,130  50,360
Long-term  credit banks  873,290  545,290  18,540
Trust banks 
3 258
1 0 614,800  34,990
Regional banks  2,681,600  1,845,830  22,390
Regional banks I  1,992,540  1,335,450  16,580
Regional banks 11  689,0601  510,380  53810  _+
Other  fmancial  institutions  2638,9201  1,291,080  3320
Total  13,025,3101  7,043,130,  129,600  _  4
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Note: * Loans for which interest has been reduced to a level below the official discount rate.
30Table 6:  Profits of Deposit-Taking Financial Institutions
First half of fiscal 1995, 100 million  yen)
Operating  Ordinary  Net profits  LAtalt gins  Of
profits  profits  listed scurities
Major 21 banks  24,110  5,710  2,490  128,340
City banks  13,100  4,550  1,960  80,960
Long-term credit banks  3,270  620  290  25,040
Trust banks  2,740  540  240  22,340
Regional banks  9,6!0  5,020  2,200  59,090
Regional banks 1  7,010  3,950  1,750  50,710
Regional banks II  2,600  1,070  450  S,3o0
Other financial institutions  7,460  . 15,950
Total  41,1801  - 203,380
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Table 7:  Trends in Nonperforming Loans Held by Major 21 Banks*'
(trillion yen)
FY1991  1992  1993  1994  1995*2
Operating profits  2.4  3.2  3.2  2.8  2.4
Losses from disposal of nonperfonning loans  0.7  1.6  4.1  5.5  2.0
of which:  Transfer to special reserve account a  0.5  1.1  1.7  2.4  0.8
LossesfromtransfertoCCPCb  - 0.2  1.9  2.1  0.8
Nonp  .fomiing  loans  |  approx  8.0  12.8  13.6  12.5  13.0 Nonperforniing  loans C
(Ratio to total assets,  percent)  (1.13)  (1.93)  (2.09)  (1.96)  (1.68)
of which:  Unresolved amount  n.a.  5.8  5.1  3.2  3.3
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Notes: *1 City banks, long-term credit banks and trust  banks.
,2  First half of fiscal 1995.
a. Including  ordinary redemption.
b. Cooperative  Credit Purchasing Company, Ltd.
c. Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans, end of fiscal year.
Table 8: Risk Asset Ratio of Banks*'
(End of fiscal year, the number of banks. Parenthesized  numbers are as of the end of FY 1993.)
||  FY 1992  FY 1993  FY 1994*2  2  _
____  B  J  [City  banks  Long-term  Tnist banks  Regional  Regional
Av  - - j  credit banks  banks I  banks ll
Av. (___  i  9.30  9.71  9.03  8  .87( 9.68)  8.76O  9.25)  9.38(10.47)  9.45( 9.78)
Over  lIl%  1  2  1  0(0)  0(0)  0(0)  1(2)  0(0)
10-11  8  25  10  '(1)  0(0)  1(7)  8(17)  0(0)
9-10  l  52  45  40  2 (10)  I (3)  4 (0)  28  (25)  5 (7)
8-9  I  28  17  36  8(0)  2(0)  2(0)  18(12)  6(5)
UnderS%  I  l  0  1  1  0  0)  0(0)  0  (0)  I  °  0(0)  1(0)
Total  90  89  88  j  11(11)  3 (3)  1  7  (7)  55 (56)  12 (12)
Source: Bank of Japan.
Notes:  *I  Banks that adopt the criterion of BIS (8%).
.2  Based on a prompt report.
31Table  9: Estimation  of Capital  Adequacy  after the Lump Sum Write-Off
(trillion  yen,  %/6)
Non-perfornung  Loss  Special reserve  Latent gains of  Capital account  Owned capital  Owned capital
loan  account  listed security  ratio  ratio aftw the
write-  off
Long4terrm  3.9  3.7  0.9  1.9  2.9  8.8  4.7
City  10.2  8.4  3.8  5.6  15.0  8.9  7.8
Trust  5.6  4.1  0.8  1.61  3.6  9.4  4.5
Total  19.7  16.3  5.5  9.1  21.4  8.9  6.9
Source: MURASHIMA  (1995)
Note: Method of estimation is referred in the text.
Table 10: Estimated Availabilit  of Financing through Issues of Preferred Stock
Capital  Issued stock  Issued stock  Availability  Availability of  Ratio to
(trillion  Common  (100 million  Preferred  (100 million  (100 million  fmnancing  risk asses
yen)  (trillion  shares)  (trillion  shares)  shares)  (trillion yen)
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _~  yen  y__  _  en)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Long4erm  0.8  0.8  64.8  0.0  0.0  32.4  3.7  5.6%
City  3.9  3.8  270.9  0.1  0.5  135.0  15.7  4.9%
Trust  1.0  1.0  65.2  10.0  0.0  32.6  2.3  4.0%
Total  5.7  5.6  401.0  0.1  0.5  200.0  21.7  _
Source: MURASHIMA  (1995)
Notes: Referred senlement is March 1995.  Preferred  stock issued by Daiwa bank in summer is not considered.
Price of preferred stock is assumed to be 80% of common stock in Oct. 1995.
Table 1  1: Ne  ative Effects of Nonperforring  Loan on Bank Lending
Constant  Ratio of net worth  Ratio of  bad debt to total  R-squar,  F-statistic
(September 1992)  loan  Std. deviation
(March  1993)
City banks.  -62.986  7.545'*  -1.006  0.424  6.620
Long-term credit banks,  (-3.428)  (3.554)  (-1.656)  2.715
Trust banks  -58.656  6.654*s  0.336  9.617
(21 banks)  (-3.087)  (3.101)  2.836
3.391  1.122  -4.549*  0.104  3.831
Regional banks 1. 11  (0.290)  (0.866)  (-2.284)  4.603
(69 banks)  13.461  - -5.028**  0.094  6.938
(12.609)  (-2.634)  4.595
Source:  Economic Survey ofJapan  1994, Economic Planning  Agency, Japan.
Notes:  Dependent  variable is growth  rate of accumulated loan (from the end of Sep. 1992 to the end of Sep. 1993).
Explaiatory variables are (1) ratio ofnet worth at the end of Sep. 1992 and (2) ratio of bad debt at the end ofMar.  1993.
Significance  =  i  10%, **  2.5%/.
32Table 12: Recent Loans from Japan's Deposit Insurance Corporation
Time  Insolvent institutions  Amount of assistance  Accepted institutions  Method of deling
91.10  TOHO mutual bank  Loan S billion yen  IYO bank (regional)  Merger
92.6  TOYO credit  association  Donation 20 billion yen  SANWA bank (city)  Merger
93.6  KAMAISHI credit  association  Donation  26 billion yen  IWATE bank (regional)  Business transfer and liquidate
93.7  OSAKA  citizn's credit  union  Donation 19.9 billion yen  OSAKA-KOHYO  credit union  Merger
94.11  GIFU-SYOHGIN credit  union Donation 2.5 billion  yen  KANSAI-KOHGIN credit  Merger
union
95.2  TOKYO-KYOWA credit  Donation 40 billion yen  TOKYO-KYODO bank  Business transfer and liquidate
union & ANZEN credit  union  (establish  new bank)
95.5  YUAI credit  union  Donation 2.8 billion yen  KANAGAWA labor's  Business  transfer and liquidate
association
95.8  COSMO credit  union  Donation 110 billion yen  TOKYO- KYODO bank  Business transfer and liquidate
95.9  HYOGO bank  Donation 400 billion yen  MIDORI bank  Business transfer and liquidate
I ____________________  ____________________  ______________________  (establish new bank)
95.9  KIZU credit  union  Donation  400 billion  yen  Not decided  Business  transfer and liquidate
Cited fro  " State ofJapaneseEconom.-  Reviewand  Issues ofJapanese Economy in 1995," pp. 129. Research Bureau, Economic
Planning Agency,  December 22, 1995.
Table 13:  Past Cases of Bailouts
Countries  Contents  Amount of Expenditure
U.S.A.  Establishing  the RTC funded by government  expenditure  and related  About 100 billion dollars (2% of
institution's fund  GDP)
U.K.  First life boat (73-74) with cooperative  loan by BOE and commercial  bank  About 1.2 billion pounds (1.4% of
GDP)
Norway  Capital support by government bank-guaranteed fund and liquidity support by  About 20 billion kroner (2.7% of
central bank  GDP)
Sweden  Establishing Financial Support Agency and  spending  the budget  fund  About 65 billion kroner (4.5% of
GDP)
Finland  Buying out the banks by the subcontracting  enterprise funded by the central  About 33.5 billion markkaa (7% of
bank and establishing the governnent-guaranteed fund  GDP)
Source:  S.  Enkyo (1995).
Table 14: Comparison of the Deposit Insurance Cororation
Japan  USA
Establishunent  1971  1933
Menbership (enforcement)  Banks, credit  associations  union and  Federal licensed bank, members of
labor credit  associations  FRS, Federal licensed  savings bank,
Fund  876 billion yen (95 Mar.)  13.12 billion S (94 end)
Fare  0.012% of savings stock covered  by  0.0 to 0.27% depending on the
_________________________________  insurance  institution's condition
Limit  10 million yen per depositor  0.1 nillion S per account
Function  Financial aid  Yes  Yes
Pay off  Yes  Yes
Success of asset and liability  No  Yes
Administrator  No  Yes
Monitoring  No  Yes
Cited from "State ofJapanese Economy--Review and Issues ofJapanese Economy in 1995," pp. 173. Research Bureau, Economic
Planning Agency, December 22, 1995.
33Table 15:  Effects of 25 Percent  Fall in Land Price  in Japan
(percent  changes  from  baseline  values)
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
JAPAN
GM  (1
9 t5Spzice)  -0.4  -1.1  -1.4  -1.7  -1.7  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5 ... ~~~~~............_.  ........  _._._..  .....................................  ........  Y......... fy.........  . ......... II.........  E  .. i.........II.........E  .4  ._
Dt  ic !  ra  -0..............5  -1.3  -t. 3  -2.2  -2.  3  -2.2  -2.2  -2.2  -2.1
Private  c  m  -0.6  -1.5  -2.0  -2.5  -2.3  -2.9  -2.9  -2.9  -2.6
HeuFi.x  tment  -0.1  -0.6  -1.3  -1.5  -1.7  -2.0  -2.2  -2.9  -3.3 _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~...  .................  _._  ........................  ................................................. 1.................................  ....._
Business  fixed  invesinuS  -0.7  -2.0  -2.7  -3.0  -2.3  -2.2  -1.9  -1.9  -1.9
E  sfied  t  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.0  0.6
Inyort  f  oods  -0.3  -1.4  -2.3  -3.3  -3.9  4.0  -3.3  -4.0  -3.7 ..... ,,....,,,..........................................................................................  .......  ........
Mineral  fau  -0.3  -1.1  -1.5  -1.7  -1.7  -1.5  -1.3  -1.3  -1.3 ...........................  ....................................................  .....................................................................................................................  .....
Raw material  & foodstuff  -0.3  -1.0  -1.6  -2.2  -2.5  -2.6  -2.7  -2.6  -2.4
..............................  ,,,.......  ....................................................................................................................
M  uctured goods  -0.5  -2.4  -3.  -5.7  -6.7  -7.4  -7.3  -7.5  -6.3
....................................................................................  ......................  ..........................................................................  ....
Rcalsl,t-ter  interestratc  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.5  1.0  1.6  2.3  3.1
.....................---  ,.,._-  .....................  .................................... I  ........  l  ........  .........  .................... 
Real lang-term  i:  reat  net  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.3  0.7  1.2  1.9  2.6  3.3 ~~~~~~~~~.........................  _ _  ,............  ......................
CPI  0.0  -0.1  -0.4  -0.3  -1.5  -2.2  -2.9  -3.7  -4.4
h2  -3.4  -5.1  -5.3  -6.5  -6.3  -6.3  -7.2  -7.6  4S.0
- .-e r te (YdS?  0.2  1.0  1.6  2.0  2.1  1.6  0.4  -1.2  -3.5 ~~~~~~~~..............................  .. ,,,,,,,,......  ..........................................................................................................................
Cunea  A_cct  balancet(rado  tO  nominal  GD)'  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.  7
Gawtralp  vennent  balmnce  (ratio  to noinal  GDP  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -0.S  -0.9  -0.3  -0.9  -1.1  -1.1 ....................................................................................  ...... :!.  ....... :~  ........................................................................................... ::
StockofoutwardFDI  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.3  2.0  2.7  3.3  4.3 . .0
ULNITED  STATES
QDP (1935  pnice)  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3 ....................................................................................  ...........  .......  ± !........  :4.......  .......  21....... :R!.......  .......  :  :  : 
Ep¶s1t  of  ooda  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5  -0.7  -. 0.  -0.9  -.09  4 9  -.3  ~~~~~~......  .._._.........................................................  .............  ..  ........................................................ ::
t  of goods  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.0
Real  short-t  m  tra,t',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,  0.00  -0.02  -0.07  -0.13  -0.16  -0.17  -0.15  -0.12  -0.03
,Real lrsig-te  .inter.t !.rat.'  0---.-.-----00  0.00  -0.01  o0.02  0.03  4003  -0.01  0.00  0.01
CPI  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.05  -0.11  -0.13  -0.27  -0.35  -0.41
WORLD TRADE
World  tade vlune  (1985  price)  0.0  42  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  -0.7  -0.7
~or.pertpnce  of  in&sl....  contrie_s  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.3
World prinury conundityprica  -0.1  -0.5  -0.3  -1.1  -1.3  -1.4  -1.5  -. 6  -1.6
a. Change in percentage  ponts.
34Table 16:  Effects of 25 Percent Fall in Equity Price in Japan
(percent  changes  from  baseline  values)
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  S  9
JAPAN
GDP (1935  pric0  .0.2  -0.2  40.2  40.3  -0.3  0.2  40.2
Domne  dcbsop  .0.1  -01  .0.2  0.3  03  44  4  0.3  03
Private  commtion  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.4  -0.3
HOA  ntmnt  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  43  4.3  -0.4  0.5
- ----------------------. _  _._  ..  ____._  __._  ...... _  _._._._._  __  .......... _._____  _..._............
Businer fixed nvetment  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -044  -0.3  403 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~............  ..  ......  ....  . .........  ....................................  ........ I
xporoods.0.0  0.0  00  0.1  01  0.1  0l.  0.1  0.1 ~~~~~~.............................  ._  ........... _  -. _._  .....  _  _  ._.....  -
ifo  t  0of  ,1  .00  -0  2  -0 3  -0.4  -0.5  4.  . 06  4.6  .0  5 ......  ....  c ......  ......................................................  ..........  ....  ......  _  _  ........  ........... _.6  _  .6 _  ._6_
Minei  fuel  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1 ~~~~~~~~~~~.................................................  .....................................  ................................ i.....................i......
Raw  material  &  foodanaff  0~~~~~~~~~.0  -0.1  -02:  -0.3  0.3  0.  -0.4  4 .4  40.3
Manufac'ured  ;ooda  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4  4.7  -0.3  -11  . -1  . -1.0
Real shottm  intceTt rate'  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4
........ ~~~~~~~~~~......................................  ............................................  .............................................................................................  _  . .l*ong.t~min~u:  rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5
CPI  0.0  0.0  Q0.  -0  .1  -0.2  40.3  -0.4  -0.  4.*06 .............  _  _  _  _.....  _.............................................................................  _._...._.._._..  _..._._.
M2,  _  -0.3  -0.5  -0.7  _-0.2  0.9  _-1.2  -1.0  1.0  _-1.0 ............  ... ......  ...  ............. ..................................................  ........RI........ ~R........  ......  A3.... .::  ....  . .±....  ...............  .......... .
Current account  balance  (ratio  to nominal  GDPR  0.0  0  . 0 0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
e  balance  (ratio  to noninal GDP)  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 ~~~~~~~~~~~..........  -..................  M  ............  .......................................  .........  ............. .................  ...... .............  ... .......
Stock ofoutward FDI  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.3
a. Changes  in percentage  points.
35Table 17: Japan's Import  Growth  by Category  and by East Asian  Trading  Partner
(as, owyle a0 zrmlt  dala vah)  _
srrc  ramd loilu cuegy  Pcnod  T.W  I  por  From  Et  Asi  Cthi  S.  onm  libuoneri  Mal"a  Philim  Thlant  Nora  Siwpn  Taiwan
54  MEDICINAL.PHALM  PRODUCTS  193145  3.0  .7.1  5.1  7.5  6.3  .47.3  .4.3  .124  4.0
191690  13.2  S.  23.5  13.6  -37.2  1.1  16.9  0.1  -1.  7.
1991-94  10.7  16.7  20.1  21.4  126.6  529.3  .5.1  9.5  106.4  .9.2  3.2
51  PERFUMR.CL  IANiO  FTM  PRD  1911-S5  5.5  7.8  12.9  -4.4  8.6  36.0  24.2  2.2  -12.3  5.7
2916-90  22.9  22.2  27.5  19.4  31.1  167.1  7.8  -3.6  3II.  28.
__________________________  2991-4  21.'  16.4  4.3  90.2  23.3  35.'  23.3  235.7  -4.6  21.i  -2.6
63WOOD.CORJCMANUFACTP.S  NIS  1981435  8.7  9.9  118.0  .14.7  71.9  12.4  20.2  .3.6  .2.2  6.2  .3.1
2916-90  48.  41.4  40.7  16.0  65.3  40.3  24.0  312  21.8  122.7  14.
I992.94  19.5  19.8  31.2  .9.5  I7.8  49.9  8.0  23.1  .12.0  -16.  .02
64 PAPRR.PAPERBOAR.D  AND MFR  198145  3 3  -21.  1.1  .25.4  .10.B  94.3  -44.7  -13.3  13.5  -7.2  .23.
I26-90  2.1  21.4  19.3  0.9  77.3  231.2  127.8  223  63.6  19.  23.
2991.94  2.  12.7  33.9  16.9  98.7  66.9  87.3  40.3  9.7  114.5  .13.8
71 POWEROENERATINO  EQUIPMT  1981-9  14.4  16.  -3.0  13.6  -38.6  -39.3  .27.4  51.8  37.2  26.3  14.
1986-90  27.9  35.3  253.1  31.1  151.3  69.6  287.0  39.3  27.4  45.5  I3.
I992.94  10.6  13.7  32.6  4.8  4.9  23.3  58.  32.8  2.9  13.  -5.
75OFFICE MACHNES.ADPEQUIP  I29145  20.5  35.3  56.3  15.6  .7.0  179.8  71.2  31.6  54  69
I26-90  32.  64.7  1225.  46.4  41.8  475.1  133.6  179.2  40.4  137.3  30
I991.94  17.9  40.0  76.6  13.4  155.7  40.5  14.2  33.7  6.0  53.8  55.
76TELEtCMM,SOUNDEQUIPMENT 191245  3.3  5.7  63.1  11.7  45.7  -29.0  36.2  19.7  -22.5 I  . 32
1986-90  36.  43.7  85.9  31.6  286.4  1U.3  399.7  259.3  4.10  64.3  29.
l992-94  24.  27.3  61.3  5.9  102.2  53.3  29.5  40.6  2.0  21.  .0.5
77  DLWMTIC MACHINRY  NES EX  1981485  7.7  2.1  33.7  3.3  -32.8  -2.5  -34.8  27.1  25.6  9.3  3.4
1986-90  27.  38.8  122.8  28.8  291.4  56.7  101.4  194.9  30.2  35.  32.
1991-94  26.  26.0  44.5  36.1  44.9  27.5  25.3  17.0  33.6  27.6  5.1
78 ROAD  VRHICLES  191145  13.  13.3  16.3  7.8  -40.6  -35.6  17.8  7.1  16.8  1.2  32.
1916-90  51.2  47.2  280.9  35.4  175.3  -25.5  0.8  98.8  113.1  *12.  59
2992-94  203  27.'  64.4  4.9  41.2  62.2  22.9  14.5  .24.9  29.21  2
*2 FURNITrUREPARTS  THBRBOF  191245  6.9  5.6  -L.9  14.7  14.4  -41.5  3.5  5.0  .23.2  -18.9  9.t
1916-90  36.  29.4  20.  32.1  180.0  203.3  31.3  79.4  2S.6  72  11.2
1991.94  16.7  25.3  76.2  -3.9  22.3  51.4  3.3  27.2  12.5  0.2  83
3TRAVELOOODS.HANDBAOS  191145  2.4  10.7  21.2  19.4  15.3  1.3  27.3  .1S.4  38.4  22L
1916-90  41.  48.1  88.9  44.3  1  14.6  41.  109.4  33.9  106.2  29.
1199-94  16.8  21.0  48.0  0.2  55.6  23.6  37.1  25.1  .5.2  27.9  3.
4 CLoTHINa AND  ACCESSORIES  i9n1485  2.6  4.5  16.5  2.  S*0  23.7  .16.3  4.0  2.7  .5.5  2.2
1986-90  32.  28.6  4421  25.  159.5  5.4  45.9  96.3  13.6  53.3  3.
1199-94  17.5  19.2  36.1  -5.3  27.0  34.7  15.3  15.6  -20.8  4.5  .11.
9SFOOTWEAR  198145  6.2  5.2  13.  5  4.5  .160  30.9  2S.2  222.8  3.0  90.2  3.4
1916-90  27.  28.7  41.  31.  3  28S.3  30.3  263  208.1  43.5  10.5  16.
_  99  1-94  127  13.3  49.1  -7.6  12.6  2.3  22.0  25.9  -7.7  0.3  -17.5
87 PRRCISION  INSTRUM  NTS  NES  911-S  7.  7.0  0.5  -24  2.1  -24.  3  70.6  1232  29  162.
1916-90  22.  49.3  92.9  45.6  141.4  5S.8  321.8  110.6  61.6  31.3  51.9
1991-94  9.5  21.7  49.5  6.0  27.7  21.0  67.1  49.3  -1216  21.  21.
88  PHoToBQU,OPTICL  DSTc  291145  3.4  10.4  88.5  21.5  -339  -16.1  -668  9.9  9.1  13.7  25.9
2916-90  29.1  19.3  62.2  4.6  112.4  55.3  41.3  55.8  14.7  4.8  27.
1991-94  10.  128.8  534.  421  200  7.8  205.5  41.3  10.5  -14.4  12.3
NOe:  Pesiad gowth nte is compid  as  a smple svmp  of annual  growth  rt.
Souu:  UNJCOMTRADE  detebsi.
36[FIGURES]
Figure 1:  Growth in Japan's GDP and Industrial Production,  1985-95
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Figure 2:  Inflation and Unemployment  Rates, 1985-95
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37Figure 3:  Total Value of Stock / Nomninal  GDP, 1970-94
(1970  - 100)
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Note: At market  price.  Tokyo  Stock Exchange-lst  Section.
Figure 4:  Total Value of Land I Nominal GDP, 1970-94
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Note: Urbanized  areas  in 6 big cities, all types of land  use.
Figure 5:  Discount Rate and Long-Term Lending Rate, 1985-95
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3  8Figure  6:  Growth  in Money  Suppy  (NU)  and  Bank  Loans, 1985-95
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Source:  Bank  of Japan.
Notes: *1  AU baniks,  end of year.
* 2 All banks,  90-179  days.
Figure 13: Credit Crunch
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42Figure  14:  Recent Rescues  by the Bank of Japan Based on Code 25 (Tokuyu)
Bank of Japan
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Source:  "State ofJapanese Economy--Review and Issues ofJapanese Economy in 1995-" p. 130.
Research Bureau of the Economic Planning Agency, December 22, 1995.
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43Figure  16:  Effects on Japanese  Economy
Real GDP  Real GDP
0.5  *l-Si-  SI.5-.  ..  -SII  1  4  ..  S2  +-*S3  -- &--S4  Sw-5
0.5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
0  ,..  . 0
.. ~  A  0
-0.5  -0.
__.  .- ea
-1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
-ES  -2  ;; 
.2L  -2.5
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Ye  _  _  Year
, ~  Real Long-Temn  Interest  Rate  %  Real  Long-Term  Interest  Rate
o%  -S  -- S3 -S3.S4  SS
0.7  0.2
@1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  I.  _K.  - . .
0.4  14
0.2  1.  .





%  -St  .. SI  --- Si  4  -'ss 
0.5  ~~~~~~~~~~-S1  S.  2  -83  8  8
0  0~ 
40.5






0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  a  9  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Year  Year
Note: %  percentage  changes from baseline. %PT= percentage point changes from baseline.
44Figure  16:  Effects on Japanese  Economy (contintued)
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4sFigure 17: Effects on Japanese Imports and FDI
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